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In the aftermath of the Second Congo War, a range of transitional justice mechanisms was 
adopted in the ungoverned Kivu provinces in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), characterised by the lack of political settlement, the decline of government control, and 
the prevalence of different types of violence other than armed fighting. In the wake of this, the 
Kivus became entangled in a myriad of daunting challenges in their pursuit of justice and 
sustainable peace, particularly through the formal transitional justice mechanisms introduced 
by the transitional government. The failure of state-led transitional justice mechanisms led to 
the implementation of the Barza Inter-Communautaire (Barza) – a local justice mechanism - 
as a part of a national strategy for reconciliation.  
 
In times of ongoing conflict, the Barza was embodied in the constellation of power shaped by 
local, national and international political dynamics. The Barza-led justice processes during 
armed conflicts have had both positive and negative impacts on the Kivu provinces. On the one 
hand, the mechanism - with its restorative potentials - had a pacifying effect on armed conflict 
since it had the capacity to resolve conflict and de-escalate ethnic violence. On the other hand, 
the mechanism also had an increasing effect on conflict intensity which would contribute to a 
greater likelihood of conflict recurrence. This is because the Barza mechanism was capable of 
being manipulated by warring parties as a part of their political tactics, in conjunction with 
their military operations. Hence, the manner in which armed conflicts were settled and 
wrongdoings were addressed through the Barza during the 2003-06 transition had significant 


















Map: The eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
Source: the Rift Valley Institute
  
Table of Contents 
 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background: The Continuing Violence in the Kivu Provinces in the Eastern DRC 1 
1.2 Statement of Problem: Transitional Justice Mechanisms in Ungoverned Spaces 4 
1.3 Purpose of the Study:  
      Impacts of the Barza Inter-Communautaire on Conflict Dynamics   6 
1.4 Research Question         7 
1.5 Research Design          7 
1.6 Research Methodology         8 
1.7 Definition of Terms         9 
 
CHAPTER 2: Local Transitional Justice in Ungoverned Spaces: Theoretical Issues 
2.1 Introduction          10 
2.2 A Brief Historical Evolution and Definition: Local Justice in Transitional Justice 10 
2.2.1 The Emergence of Local Justice in Transitional Justice   10 
2.2.2 Definition of Local Justice       11 
2.3 The Local Turn in Transitional Justice: Promises and Pitfalls    12 
2.3.1 The Promises of Local Justice Mechanisms     12 
 2.3.1.1 The Perceived Legitimacy and Increased Effectiveness  12 
2.3.1.2 Greater Responsive to Affected Populations    12 
2.3.1.3 A Promise for Reconciliation      13 
2.3.1.4 Potential Complements to Other Transitional Justice Mechanisms 14 
2.3.2 The Pitfalls of Local Justice Mechanisms     15 
 2.3.2.1 Over-Eulogising of Local Justice     15 
 2.3.2.2 The Problem of  Horizontalising Conflict    15 
 2.3.2.3 State-Sponsored Informalism      16 
 2.3.2.4 Ill-Suited Approach to Dealing with Mass Atrocities             17 
 2.3.2.5 The Trouble with Social Capital     17 
 2.3.2.6 Problematic Relationship Between  Forgiveness and Reconciliation 18 
2.4 Transitional Justice in Ungoverned Spaces      19 
2.4.1 The Presence of Multiple Regulatory Authorities    19 
2.4.2 The Prevalence of Violence: Direct, Structural and Cultural Violence  20 
  
 2.4.2.1 Direct Violence in Ungoverned Spaces    21 
 2.4.2.2 Structural Violence in Ungoverned Spaces    22 
 2.4.2.3 Cultural Violence in Ungoverned Spaces    22 
2.5 Conclusion          23 
 
CHAPTER 3: The Political Landscape in the Kivu Provinces: Contextual Framework 
3.1 Introduction          25  
3.2 A Brief History of Conflict and Violence in the Kivu Provinces                          25 
3.3 The Kivus in the Transitional Period (2003-2006)     29 
3.3.1 The Political Stalemate        29  
3.3.2 The Manipulation of Ethnicity       30 
3.3.3 The Proliferation of Armed Groups      31 
3.3.4 The Emergence of a New Order in the Kivus     32 
3.4 The History and Functions of the Barza Inter-Communautaire    33 
3.4.1 The Rise and Fall of the Barza Inter-Communautaire    33 
3.4.2 The Functions of the Barza Inter-Communautaire    35 
3.5 Conclusion          36 
 
CHAPTER 4: The Contributions of the Barza Inter-Communautaire 
4.1 Introduction          38  
4.2 Inclusion of Violent Non-state Actors       38 
4.3 Reconciliation among Ethnic Communities      41 
4.3.1 Relational Perspective on Reconciliation: (Re) Building Trust  42 
4.3.2 Identity-Based Perspective on Reconciliation:  
         Constructing Newly Reconciled Identity     43 
4.4 Complements to Other Transitional Justice Mechanisms    45 
4.4.1 Reintegration of Demobilised Combatants     45 
4.4.2 Truth-Seeking         47 
4.4.3 Women and Child Empowerment      47 






CHAPTER 5: The Failures of the Barza Inter-Communautaire 
5.1 Introduction          50 
5.2 The Danger of ‘Excessive Localisation’ of Transitional Justice    50 
5.3 The Pitfalls of Reconciliation        53 
5.3.1 Reconciliation as Resignation       53 
5.3.2 The Problem of State-Sponsored Informalism     54 
5.4 Justice Processes During Armed Conflict      56  
5.4.1 The Invention of the ‘Rwandaphonie’ Ideology    56 
5.4.2 The Malfunctions of the Barza: Mirrors of Ethnic Divisions   58 
5.5 Conclusion          60 
 
CHAPTER 6: Conclusion  
6.1 Introduction          62 
6.2 The Contributions of the Barza Inter-Communautaire     63 
6.3 The Failures of the Barza Inter-Communautaire      65 






1.1 Background: The Continuing Violence in the Kivu Provinces in the 
Eastern DRC 
Since its independence in 1960, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been 
characterised by its persistent state of violence. This violence has proven difficult to be 
resolved and managed effectively owing to the country’s complex and interrelated issues 
linking to colonial legacies, as well as to political and economic performances of the post-
colonial state. Throughout the history of the DRC conflict, the eastern border region - 
comprised of the North and South Kivu provinces, as well as the Ituri district – has been 
identified as the epicentre of conflict in the country, even though the region is geographically 
isolated from the centre of state power in Kinshasa (the DRC’s capital city).  That is to say, 
political violence in the country has been concentrated primarily in the eastern borderland 
regions, away from the capital.  
After the signing of the 2002 Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the DRC was categorised as a country in the period of political transition. 
The peace agreement, which prescribed a formal cessation of the hostilities that had consumed 
the country since 1998, was successful in reuniting rival factions in the transitional government 
and in producing credible elections in 2006. However, the agreement was unable to bring about 
the termination to conflict and violence. While areas such as northern Katanga and Ituri had 
experienced a sharp decline in violence by the year 2002, the Kivu provinces found themselves 
embroiled in an upward spiral of conflict reaching levels as high as they had been during 
wartime. Since the political transition, the Kivu provinces have been experiencing continued 
armed mobilisation, and generating a multitude of armed groups, which has resulted in over 
two dozen emerging over the past two decades (Stearns, 2012:7) Living conditions in the Kivus 
have also been deteriorating considerably due to the escalation of hostilities. Hence, rather than 
the entire eastern region, the North and South Kivu provinces in particular have arguably 
become major sources of instability in the DRC; in fact, they have become regions where the 
Congolese government faces the most substantial threat to its authority.   
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Most studies on conflict and violence in the Kivu provinces ascribe grievance over identity and 
land (Autesserre, 2009; Huggins, 2010); greedy local and international elites (Lyall, 2017); 
and,  most significantly,  a weak Congolese state (Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2009; Trefon, 
2011) as the underlying structural conditions for long-standing armed conflict. The absence or 
weakness of state power in the Kivus has facilitated the development of ‘ungoverned spaces’; 
spaces beyond the state’s control. These ‘ungoverned spaces’ create political vacuums that 
provide opportunities for non-state political and societal actors [for example, warlords, 
strongmen and traditional authorities] to ‘function’ as the state by exercising their ‘alternative’ 
modes of governance (Tull, 2003:435). In addition, the Kivu region has been subjected to 
external interference due to two factors: its geopolitical significance in the Great Lakes region, 
and its possession of strategic minerals. Thus, in the course of time, the Kivus have evolved to 
become a crucial site in which a range of local, national and international actors - both state 
and non-state - engages in competition and negotiation to exert its influence over major aspects 
of local politics, economics and security. As a result of the presence of multiple actors other 
than the central government, it becomes a necessity for local populations to develop their own 
risk-minimising strategies to survive and cope with everyday uncertainties and insecurities. 
Locals frequently do so by choosing to cooperate and negotiate with various military and 
political groups.  
The political contestation among several authorities to gain control over local populations and 
resources results in a series of armed fighting. The term ‘intractable conflict’ has been cited by 
several scholars to describe the conflicts in the Kivu provinces. According to Crocker and 
others, ‘conflicts as contestations’ are phenomena where parties will search for political options 
other than violence when the costs of continuing to fight begin to outweigh the benefits 
(Crocker et al., 2004:7). Over time, unrestrained violence not only causes physical and 
psychological suffering for locals, but also transforms patterns of the society in which locals 
can survive, cope and, moreover, profit from an uncertain socio-political environment (Larmer 
et al., 2013:1). The long-standing and widespread violence in the Kivus, on the one hand, has 
disrupted traditional social and economic structures and has militarised communities. More 
importantly, on the other hand, the violence has prompted local, national and regional actors 
to develop innovative strategies of political, social and economic control (Vlassenroot, 
2004:39), resulting in a transformation of political and economic structures, social norms, 
modes of thinking and identities in the locality (Verweijen, 2013:69). The emergence of new 
local governance structures, characterised by violent modes of regulation, progressively sets a 
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frame for local social and economic interaction outside the realm of the state (Beneduce et al., 
2006; Bernazzori &Flint, 2009). In societies experiencing prolonged armed conflict, the 
interaction and cooperation between civilians and armed actors becomes a ‘routine practice’; a 
part of their everyday lives (Giddens, 1984:60). Hence, as a result of daily negotiation between 
these actors, violence becomes normalised, routinised and, moreover,  institutionalised. This 
all contributes to the (re)production of the dominance of violent actors in the community, and 
to discourses that legitimise violence. Accordingly, the prolonged existence of violence in the 
Kivu provinces can also be perceived as an outcome of the routine negotiation between armed 
and non-armed actors (Verweijen, 2013:69) 
The Kivus thus meet the definition of ‘ungoverned spaces. The Kivus are zones that have 
become sites of contested authority because of three factors: the presence of multiple 
authorities that have developed a respective stake in the provinces; the potential upheaval of 
established governance (Beswick, 2009:337); and the continuous prevalence of violence. In 
ungoverned areas, violence becomes a means of making a profit for opportunists, and assists 
them in leveraging their power. Also, the use of violence can be morally justified as a coping 
mechanism by local populations in insecure environments. These aforementioned 
characteristics of the Kivus create barriers to successful state-led peace and security efforts in 
the areas.  
In the aftermath of the Second Congo War, several post-conflict reconstruction mechanisms 
were implemented - transitional justice mechanisms included. Importantly, transitional justice 
mechanisms were implemented in the Kivu localities during the 2003-06 political transition. 
The transitional justice mechanisms were adopted to respond to past systematic and widespread 
human rights violations, and to provide ‘justice’ through the set of judicial and non-judicial 
measures. The objective of these endeavours was to create a stepping stone for peace, 
reconciliation and democracy. These reconstructive mechanisms, however, were implemented 
in vain; the transitional justice operation was thwarted because of the complexity of the 






1.2 Statement of Problem: Transitional Justice Mechanisms in Ungoverned 
Spaces  
 
The Kivus encountered a myriad of daunting challenges in their pursuit of justice and 
sustainable peace, particularly through the two formal transitional justice mechanisms 
introduced by the transitional government: (1) the domestic judicial system; and (2) the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (Commission Verité et Réconciliation: CVR). These two 
mechanisms will be elaborated on briefly.  
In terms of the domestic judicial system, the DRC’s judicial system was in a state of disarray 
due to poor investment over the previous decades. Domestic prosecutions would therefore been 
unfeasible because of a lack juridical independence, an inadequate investigative capacity, 
widespread corruption, the amnesty provision that was established as a part of the peace 
agreement, and the role of the military tribunal (Savage & Kambala, 2008:338).  
In terms of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Commission had failed to unveil 
itself as an independent and credible institution. This was largely because it had an 
unrealistically board mandate, a lack of professional capacity among the Commission’s staff, 
corruption among magistrates, and the Commission’s process of reconciliation without truth 
seeking and ‘just’ retribution (Savage, 2006:9). These factors inevitably created challenges to 
truth finding (Savage & Kambala, 2008:347).  
The failure of formal transitional justice mechanisms to respond to serious crimes in the Kivus 
led to an increased interest into the possibilities of implementing local justice mechanisms. 
Alternative mechanisms were thus pursued by local communities in order to seek peace and to 
restore justice. Among the plethora of traditional or community-based dispute mechanisms, the 
system of traditional community court - known as the Barza - had previously been used in the 
locality for generations. Its functions were to compensate for criminal actions and to restore 
relations between local community members. It thus had similar functions to that of the state-
initiated CVR (Villa-Vicencio et al., 2005:58).    
In the wake of the growing hostility along ethnic lines throughout the pre-national election, the 
community-led court in the Kivu provinces - known as the Barza Inter-Communautaire 
(Barza) - was established and was formally recognised in 2003 as a part of a national strategy 
for reconciliation. The adoption of the Barza mechanism can be attributed to the fact that it 
dealt directly with the most large-scale conflict in the Kivu provinces: the interethnic conflict 
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between the Banyarwanda and the Non-Banyarwanda. Most of the fighting in the Kivus  in 
the present draws directly on a long-standing rift between the Hutu and Tutsi populations 
(Banyarwandan)- those who arrived as immigrants during the colonial and post-colonial 
periods, and the so-called ‘autochthonous’ Congolese groups- comprised of Hunde, Nyanga, 
Tembo, Kano, Twa, and Pere communities (Stearns, 2012: 11). 
Sometime between 1998 and 2004, which was a period of tremendous political turmoil and 
armed conflict in many parts of the eastern DRC, the Barza was recognised as an effective 
mechanism in resolving ethnic conflicts, especially those over land ownership. The Barza was 
regarded as a pre-emptive measure, as it had the potential to resolve conflicts before they 
evolved into mass violent conflict (Clark, 2008:2). The Barza’s work had a pacifying effect on 
conflict intensity, which enabled the enhancement of stability and peace in the region. More of 
the Barza’s positive impacts included the reintegration of demobilised combatants, female 
empowerment (which will be elaborated on later in this thesis) and community development 
(Poole, 2014). However, in 2005, the Barza’s operation in the Kivu provinces was halted 
because of local and national political dynamics, largely linked to ethnic animosity throughout 
the pre-national election. Eventually, the Barza had collapsed altogether by the end of 2005.  
After the transition, or since the 2006 national election, political tensions and conflict in the 
region gradually intensified (Human Rights Watch, 2009). Approximately 70 armed groups 
were believed to be actively operating in the eastern DRC (Stearns & Vogel, 2015:5). Two 
armed groups in particular - the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and 
the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)  (Neethling, 2014:341) – 
effectively destabilised the region. These groups are regarded as the two most institutionalised 
armed movements in the Kivu provinces in post-electoral DRC (Neethling, 2014:341).  
The escalation of hostilities, which can be accredited largely to the rise of the CNDP and the 
proliferation of small armed groups, invites questions regarding the strengths and weaknesses 





1.3 Purpose of the Study: Impacts of the Barza Inter-Communautaire on 
Conflict Dynamics 
 
Transitional justice has gained global significance as a discipline concerned with confronting 
the past in the aftermath of violent conflict or dictatorial regimes (Buckley-Zistel et al., 2013). 
A range of mechanisms and institutions is conventionally designed to operate in post-conflict 
settings. Realistically speaking, however, these operations only have the potential to be 
effective in societies with certain degrees of stability. Thus, a suspension of fighting that has 
been agreed upon by all relevant parties is crucial and necessary before commencing the 
transitional justice processes. In the Kivus, however, transitional justice mechanisms were 
established in a context where violence had not yet ceased, despite several peace agreements 
having already been signed.   
 
In the wake of the instability and violent conflicts in the Kivus, the Barza - whose practices 
were in line with restorative justice aimed at improving and repairing the damaged 
relationships between conflicting parties – was rendered a more preferable justice mechanism, 
as opposed to formal - or retribution-oriented - justice mechanisms. The Barza justice 
mechanism subscribed to the notions of truth-telling and forgiveness, working towards social 
repair and reconciliation. In facilitating reconciliation and peace, the Barza provided structures 
and spaces for conflicting parties to express and share their grievances. Alleged perpetrators 
were invited to engage in dialogue and rituals, and to hear and respond to the allegations from 
victims so that the truth would be uncovered (Villa-Vicencio et al., 2005:59). Reconciliation 
could then be achieved through acts of forgiveness from the victims (Villa-Vicencio et al., 
2005:59).  
Even though the Barza could settle intercommunal disputes, its operation during armed conflict 
could also have adverse impacts on conflict intensity and termination. In times of ongoing 
conflict, both government and insurgents tend to resort a wide range of non-violent strategies 
combined with military operations, which directly contribute to the course of conflict and their 
favorable outcomes (Loyle & Binningsbø, 2018). Thus, the use of transitional justice 
mechanisms during ongoing conflict can be seen as a part of political strategies which has the 
potential to impact on conflict dynamics both positively and negatively. Evidently, in case of 
the Kivus, the Barza was not only employed as the local justice mechanism, but also became a 
political platform for belligerents to assert their authority on the ground.  
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Hence, by studying how violent conflict is settled and how wrongdoings are addressed through 
the Barza mechanism, we can enhance our understanding of the tactics that belligerents use in 
conflicts, as well as the impacts of traditional-based justice mechanisms on conflict dynamics.  
1.4 Research Question 
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the potential use of traditional-based 
practices of dispute resolution and reconciliation to address past human rights abuses. The rise 
of local justice in the field of transitional justice stems from a growing realisation that a 
successful transition depends greatly on the legitimacy of mechanisms and institutions. Owing 
to cultural resonation, its familiarity and its comprehensibility for locals, local justice has been 
expected to appeal to a larger number of participants, resulting in an increase in the legitimacy 
of the local transitional justice mechanism and to an increased likelihood of successful 
transition. In case of the Kivu provinces in the eastern DRC, the Barza is a case-in-point.  
To analyse the potential impacts of the Barza on conflict dynamics in the Kivus, this study 
aims to produce a reliable answer to the following question: ‘What are the contributions and 
failures of the Barza Inter-Communautaire, a local justice mechanism in the Kivu provinces in 
the eastern DRC, during the period of political transition (2003-2006)?’ 
1.5 Research Design  
 
The research question is addressed through a theoretical case study. A discussion of local 
justice scholarship provides a theoretical background, and the case study is the Barza Inter-
Communautaire - the local justice mechanism in the two Kivu provinces of the eastern DRC.  
The thesis has been divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 provides the reader with a background 
to the conflict and violence, as well as a background to the implementation of transitional 
justice mechanisms in the Kivu provinces. Chapter 2 addresses the theoretical issues of the 
thesis: the concepts of local justice and ungoverned space. Chapter 3 then presents the 
contextual framework of the thesis by providing a brief history of the conflict and a description 
of the political situation in the Kivu provinces during the transitional period (2003-2006). Next, 
chapter 4 and chapter 5 will analyse the positive contributions and the failures of the Barza in 
producing justice and peace in the Kivu provinces respectively. Lastly, chapter 6 will present 
the findings of the study of the impacts of the Barza on the Kivu provinces.  
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1.6 Research Methodology 
 
Data collection and analysis 
The analysis is based on secondary materials that address the processes of transitional justice 
in the Kivu provinces in the eastern DRC, particularly the operation of the Barza, which can 
arguably be considered as the only active and effective transitional justice mechanism in the 
provinces during the period of transition. Therefore, official documents and publications from 
the Congolese government, the international organisations such as the United Nations, and 
local non-governmental organisations have primarily been examined. In addition, contributions 
from various sets of academic literature have been taken into account. Both general theoretical 
concepts in the fields of transitional justice, and conflict and peace studies - including state 
governance and the specific study of the Barza - have been drawn on in the study so as to 
develop the reliable analysis. 
This study takes critical analysis approach to secondary data with an aim to offer alternative 
perspectives to knowledge, theory-building, and social reality relating to local transitional 
justice in the ungoverned and protracted violent conflict setting like the Kivu provinces in the 
eastern DRC. 
Scope  
The study will be focused only on the Kivu provinces. The Kivu provinces consist of the lower 
part of North Kivu [namely the Goma city and the territories of Masisi, Rutshuru, Nyiragongo, 
and Walikale, commonly known as the Petit Nord] - arguably the epicentre of conflict in the 
eastern DRC. The Ituri district, although located in the northern part of the eastern DRC, has 
been excluded from the analysis since it has a very specific pattern of violence and a different 
set of actors from the lower part of North Kivu. The major source of conflict in the Ituri district 
has been between the agriculturist Lendu, and pastoralist Hema ethnic groups. More 
importantly, the Barza was employed only in the Kivu provinces, where violence has been 




1.7 Definition of Terms 
The following concepts are critical for following and understanding the study:  
‘Transitional justice’ is defined as the concept of justice related to political developments in 
times of post-conflict, prominently characterised by legal responses to the transgressions of 
predecessor regimes (Teitel, 2003:69). The aims of transitional justice vary depending on the 
context where they operate, but the following features are common and constant, regardless of 
the context: redressing legacies of mass human rights abuse, recognising the dignity of victims, 
and preventing the recurrence of conflict and violence (ICTJ, 2008). 
‘Transitional context’ describes the context in which societies undertake transitional justice 
processes. Such contexts can vary widely in terms of institutional and political fragility, the 
nature of conflict and violence, and levels of economic and social development Duthie, 
2017:1). Transitional contexts have significant implications for transitional justice processes’ 
response to massive human rights violations.  
‘Local justice’ will be defined as ‘everyday justice’ in the locality; that is, how local people 
produce justice in their everyday lives, which is influenced by their understandings of state 
law, customary law, spiritual practices and normative beliefs - including situations on the 
ground (Waldorf, 2016:160). Local justice has been perceived as a type of restorative justice: 
a normative theory of social repair that aims to improve the relationship between conflicting 
parties in conflict-torn societies, rather than prosecute perpetrators.  
‘Ungoverned’ describes the decline of formal political order in a particular area. This decline 
eventually culminates in the distribution or reconfiguration of power and authority, in which 
rebel groups act as substitutes for a central government and exercise political domination (Tull, 
2003:432). Accordingly, the ‘ungoverned space’ is a site in which multiple regulatory 
authorities cooperate and contest over the management of local security, public services and 






Local Transitional Justice in Ungoverned Spaces: Theoretical 
Issues 
2.1 Introduction 
In chapter 2, the two core concepts of the thesis will be examined.  The first section addresses 
the concept of local justice. This section introduces the brief historical evolution and definition 
of local justice, as well as its positive features and limitations. In this regard, this section is 
aimed at providing general ideas of local justice; that is, what local justice is, how it works, 
and what its potential impacts are. In the second section, the concept of ‘ungoverned space’ 
will be conceptualised. The two fundamental features of ungoverned space - multiple 
regulatory authorities and the prevalence of violence - will be examined. The second section 
purposes to demonstrate the complex reality of ungoverned space as ‘transitional context.’ 
 
 
Section 1: Local Justice 
 
2.2 A Brief Historical Evolution and Definition: Local Justice in 
Transitional Justice  
 
2.2.1 The Emergence of Local Justice in Transitional Justice  
 
Historically, the origins of modern transitional justice can be traced to World War I, but the 
concept has not become mainstreamed into the language of academic and policy practices until 
the 1980s to the early 1990s- years associated with the collapse of the military regimes in Latin 
America and the dissolution of Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe (Balasco, 
2013:200). In contemporary times, transitional justice has gained global significance as an 
emerging discipline that addresses past transgressions in the aftermath of violent conflict or 
dictatorial regimes. In the course of its evolution, the discipline has hinged itself on victim-
oriented perspectives,  thereby providing a sense of recognition to victims as people affected 
by mass atrocities, and  - more fundamentally - as citizens. Hence, transitional justice 
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mechanisms, both judicial and non-judicial tools which relate to the different concepts of 
justice [retributive, restorative and distributive justice], can be interpreted as efforts to 
institutionalise the recognition of individuals in a conflict-torn society as full citizens with 
equal rights (De Greiff, 2012:42-43). However, the mechanisms are conventionally designed 
as corrective, legalistic and short-term affairs (Waldorf, 2012:173) by over-eulogising the 
notion of legal or retributive justice.  
Over time, the growth of transitional justice as an international norm and practice has resulted 
greater introspection of the field. Conventional transitional justice, characterised by legal 
fundamentalism, is interrogated with theoretical questions as well as pragmatic and ethical 
concerns, particularly the question of the effectiveness and impacts of transitional justice 
mechanisms on localities (Buckley-Zistel, 2013:9). There are several serious arguments against 
the retributive justice; namely, the politics of prosecution (victor’s justice); the difficulty in 
prosecuting all perpetrators and the impossibility of mass arrests; the impunity gap due to the 
selective prosecution and the strict dichotomy of victim and perpetrator; the inability to deal 
with structural context of violence; the focus on perpetrators over victims; and the problem of 
social and cultural alienation, including the cost of trails (Valji, 2009). Under the light of both 
substantial and technical concerns, conventional transitional justice faces a major challenge: 
the problem of legitimacy, which has the potential to generate resentment, resistance and 
conflict in localities.  
Accordingly, from the mid-1980s onwards, there has been a growing demand for an expansion 
of the transitional justice discipline to accept the notion of ‘legal pluralism’: the 
acknowledgment of the multiple overlapping systems of justice that exist in reality. This 
demand has resulted in the rise of ‘local’, ‘traditional’, or ‘non-Western’ modalities of dispute 
resolution and forms of justice; in other words, a shift from hegemonic international criminal 
justice - or a dichotomy of impunity and trails - towards multiple conceptions of justice, which 
are intimately bound with context-specific histories and cultures (Huyse, 2008:3; Sharp, 2015).   
2.2.2 Definition of Local Justice 
 
Local justice can be defined as ‘everyday justice’ in the locality; how local people produce 
justice in their everyday lives, which is influenced by their understandings of state law, 
customary law, spiritual practices and normative beliefs, including situations on the ground 
(Waldorf, 2016:160). Local justice works towards social repair and reconciliation. Its practices 
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seek to restore social order through traditional rituals and dialogue in which affected people 
can negotiate and mediate disputes in order to co-exist.  
2.3 The Local Turn in Transitional Justice: Promises and Pitfalls 
In recent years, transitional justice has been characterised as a ‘fascination with locality’ (Shaw 
&Waldorf, 2010:4  in which local justice is perceived as a means to overcome limitations of 
conventional transitional justice, particularly the problem of legitimacy. However, local justice 
itself is not infallible and has generated controversy. Its practices can have unintended 
consequences that can exacerbate situations on the ground. Accordingly, the following section 
will address the positive features and limitations of local justice. 
2.3.1 The Promises of Local Justice Mechanisms 
2.3.1.1 The Perceived Legitimacy and Increased Effectiveness 
The rise of local justice in the transitional justice industry can be attributed to the realisation 
that the goals of transitional justice can only be achieved through the legitimacy given by the 
majority of those who have been affected by mass atrocities and those who have to live with 
consequences of transitional justice processes. The reason for the inclination towards 
traditional-based practices of dispute resolution is because traditional-based practices are 
regarded as more culturally resonant, familiar to and comprehensible for local populations, 
leading to a greater degree of social and cultural acceptance in communities afflicted with 
conflict (Sharp, 2015:4). Apart from the advantages of familiarity and accessibility, local 
justice is believed to be less political owing to its lower perceived intervention from national 
governmental officials (Sharp, 2015:5). Traditional-based justice, thus, bears the potential to 
draw a greater number of participants, which prescribes the perceived legitimacy and increased 
effectiveness of transitional justice mechanisms contributing to a greater likelihood of 
successful transition.  
2.3.1.2 Greater Responsiveness to Affected Populations  
 
The current transitional justice paradigm is distinguished by the notion of local ownership and 
public participation. The model has been redesigned to pave the way for public dialogue in 
which locals not only advise on the shape and direction of the process, but also have the 
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process (Lundy & McGovern, 2008:281). 
 13 
Because the model incorporates the value of public participation, it is capable of assisting 
victims in overcoming the reproduction of conditions of alienation and oppression that envelop 
their lives. Participatory action is thus a means of empowering; it enables local people to define 
local problems or obstacles and, moreover, to initiate, design and implement their own 
solutions (Lundy & McGovern, 2008:280). Through this method, transitional justice has 
become more responsive to affected populations by accounting for their cultural values, 
traditional institutions and everyday practices of dispute resolution (Waldorf, 2016:158).  
 
2.3.1.3 A Promise for Reconciliation  
 
Local justice is perceived to be symptomatic of restorative justice; a normative theory of social 
repair that aims to improve the relationship between conflicting parties in conflict-torn 
societies. According to Van Ness and Strong, the four core elements of restorative justice are: 
encountering, ensuring reparations, participating, and reintegrating (Van Ness & Strong, 
2002). Unlike international criminal justice, local justice, with its restorative aspiration, reflects 
both backward-looking justice – namely, encountering and ensuring reparations, and forward-
looking justice – that is, participation and reintegration. By working on two aspects of justice, 
local justice bears the potential to nurture peaceful transition possible in complex conflict 
settings.  
Since local transitional justice processes are designed to confront legacies of past human rights 
abuses, their objectives are to hold perpetrators accountable through the following processes: 
truth-telling; promoting the virtue of forgiveness; and ensuring both symbolic and material 
reparations for victims (that is, backward-looking justice). Thus, local justice processes are 
influenced by the positive attributes of truth-telling and forgiveness. On the one hand, the 
restorative potential of truth can be registered through therapeutic language as a way of healing 
victims’ psychological wounds. This argument hinges on the assumption that truth as 
knowledge about the past possesses curative power. Knowing of what happened during the 
mass atrocities and why it happened would help to alleviate psychological suffering (Muddell 
&Hawkins, 2018:8). Victims can perceive a disclosure of the past as an acknowledgement of 
their resentment and hardship in times of conflict, which can potentially lead to a revival of 
trust among affected populations that was broken during wartime. On the other hand, the 
practice of forgiveness has been expected to provide a possible course of actions for peaceful 
transition in fragmented communities. The programmes of forgiveness and amnesty are 
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morally justified for the sake of the community (reconciliation), as well as for personal 
psychological benefits (healing). The concept of restorative justice is thus constructed through 
a mix of legal, political and moral (religious) languages, in which moral and psychological 
significances are highlighted.  
Besides, the restorative justice model is characterised by community participation and dialogue 
which possibly contribute to reintegration and reconciliation in affected communities (forward-
looking justice). The model provides a platform for victims, perpetrators and the larger 
community to engage in dialogue in order to achieve sustainable solutions together.  
Although the overall concept of local justice is closely linked with the restorative model of 
justice, local justice can incorporate elements of retribution and reparation. However, the 
practices of punishment and compensation hinge on their perceived legitimacy and power 
dynamics in local communities. Arguably, the restorative-retributive dichotomy in the 
transitional justice field is overstated and essentialised (Huyse & Salter, 2008).  
 
2.3.1.4 Potential Complements to Other Transitional Justice Mechanisms 
While all local justice processes involve public participation, their processes can be varied in 
the term of ‘localness’ in the extent to whether they are top-down or bottom-up initiatives; 
whether they are under local or state control; and how they are linked to more formal, state-run 
transitional justice measures (Duthie, 2010:1). In this sense, local justice processes in 
transitional context are always linked to formal transitional justice and peace processes, albeit 
in varying degrees. Therefore, rather than being presented as an alternative, local justice is 
often presented as a complementary tool to formal transitional justice and peace mechanisms 
(Duthie, 2010).  
Local justice, with its restorative potentials, may be linked in concrete ways to disarmament, 
demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes. The incorporation of restorative, 
retributive and reparative measures within local justice mechanisms can make an important 
contribution to the process of reintegration. Local justice seeks to repair the damaged 
relationship between victims and perpetrators through traditional rituals and dialogue, in which 
victims’ need for empowerment and perpetrators’ need for social acceptance can be met. Local 
justice processes can thus be instrumental in reconciling victims and perpetrators, and in 
reintegrating perpetrators into their communities.   
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2.3.2 The Pitfalls of Local Justice Mechanisms 
2.3.2.1 Over-Eulogising of Local Justice 
 
The over-eulogising of local justice and traditional authorities is high-risk as it is likely to 
obscure the working of power and force in affected communities (Theidon, 2009:2). The 
romanticisation of local justice downplays the coercive element of its practices. Local justice’s 
function of (re)asserting social control can restrict the meaningful participation of victims and 
marginalised people (Waldorf, 2006:10). The incorporation of local justice mechanisms into 
the design of transitional justice arguably reactivates the primordial modes of patriarchy in 
which indigenous custom had been invented to promote social control and political ideologies 
and led by traditional chieftaincies (Macdonald, 2017:302). Local justice can therefore be 
understood as political justice in the sense that traditional judicial elites are neither impartial 
nor independent, since the rationales behind their discretionary rulings typically serve 
‘community solidarity’ (Waldorf, 2006:11). In a search for social reconciliation, local justice 
practices promote the idea of individual responsibility to one’s community as a moral and 
political obligation, rather than promote the concept of fostering individuals’ rights and 
entitlements (Allen, 1999). In this manner, local justice is theoretically congruent with the 
notion of communitarianism; that is, the status and rights of community members are secured 
through their responsibility to the (traditional) community, and individuals cannot claim any 
rights that would jeopardise the community’s claims (Ekeh, 1975). Accordingly, local justice 
processes not only have the capacity to re-traumatise victims, but also have the potential to 
invigorate patriarchal and oppressive structures in which women and minorities are 
marginalised (Arrianza & Roht-Arriaza, 2008:161).  
2.3.2.2 The Problem of Horizontalising Conflict  
 
The preoccupation with local justice in transitional justice processes renders local justice 
susceptible to the danger of ‘excessive localisation’ (Drexler, 2009). Overemphasizing on 
customs associated with particular groups in the country can give a misleading account of 
conflict as local affairs which significantly distorts the fact that systematic human rights abuses 
can be driven by national and international factors. Hence, horizontalising conflict in particular 
areas - by framing them as simple disputes between different community groups in a society 
rather than between a state and its citizenry - not only carries the risk of stigmatising particular 
entire groups as a cause of conflict, but also conceals state-sponsored crimes perpetrated by 
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government and army officials. Such practices can result in an impunity gap between state and 
non-state violent actors (Allen & Macdonald, 2013:10). While acknowledging that the state is 
often a party to conflict, the absence of the state in local justices processes is not necessarily a 
positive undertaking, since the state has the ability to conduct accountability oversight ensuring 
that due process, proportionality and human rights are upheld during community-led justice 
processes (Johnstone, 2002:31). In this sense, the presence of the state in local justice processes 
can be advantageous to affected populations and can ensure accountability.  
2.3.2.3 State-Sponsored Informalism 
 
The dominant role of the state in local justice processes, known as ‘state-sponsored 
informalism’, can raise practical and substantial concerns about the effectiveness and intrinsic 
value of local justice. One of prominent characteristics of transitional society is that the 
environment is highly political in nature. The transitional period is a critical moment in the 
aftermath of mass atrocities, and it provides domestic elites with considerable room for 
negotiation. The high stakes in post-transitional societies lead to intense competition and 
strategic bargaining between new and old elite groups, both striving to protect their status quos 
whilst also repositioning themselves in a post-transitional society. In such a climate of political 
uncertainty, the state in transition may be more likely to reassert its hegemony amidst shifts in 
the loci of power (Clamp & Doak, 2012:350) Consequently, (formal) transitional justice 
mechanisms appear to be wielded by the state for its own political ends. Therefore, the 
decentralisation of national reconciliation processes can be perceived by local populations, 
especially in ungoverned areas, as a means for the state to use local socio-cultural capitals to 
advance its power rather than localise political decision-making. As Richard Abel argues, 
‘state-sponsored informalism expands the grasp of the state at the expense of other sources of 
authority that appear to be potential competitors’ (Abel, 1982:275). Thus, state-imposed local 
justice mechanisms can generate political tensions and increase the likelihood of conflict 
recurrence. Furthermore, the introduction of local justice mechanisms led by the state and 
sponsored by foreign actors can substantially undermine the positive attributes of informal 
systems of justice. Under state control, affected communities stand to lose their discretion in 
terms of when and how their ceremonies should be arranged. Placing local justice systems into 
a limited timeframe of national reconciliation tends to dilute the meaning of the system and 
renders it coercive (Waldorf, 2006:13).  
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Hence, a ‘state-community’ balance with regard to the multiple dimensions of local ownership 
(practices, principles, and values) is necessary because it can assist in enhancing the capacity 
and legitimacy of local justice mechanisms.  
2.3.2.4 Ill-Suited Approach to Dealing with Mass Atrocities 
 
Local justice mechanisms have conventionally been designed to address petty crimes and 
family or communal disputes, rather than mass violence or genocide  - both widespread and 
systematic attacks against civilian populations. By focusing on interpersonal and community 
levels of conflict, local justice processes can overlook structural injustices and violence – both 
of which remain prevalent and severe in post-conflict societies. The existing structures of 
injustices and violence not only fundamentally undermine the legitimacy of transitional 
mechanisms (Murphy, 2015:64), but also sustain conflict identities among parties, which can 
serve as a major hindrance to developing a mutual sense of commitment to shared norms and 
values. In light of this, local justice mechanisms seldom produce a perceived sense of justice 
and/or sustainable peace in their respective localities. 
2.3.2.5 The Trouble with Social Capital 
 
Local justice and social capital are related in two problematic ways. Firstly, the legitimacy of 
a local justice mechanism depends largely on the degree of social capital in the locality. 
Nonetheless, in war-torn societies, social capitals have usually been eroded and weakened by 
violent conflict (Waldrof, 2016:164). Without adequate existing social capitals, it is impossible 
for local justice mechanisms to operate effectively. Secondly, local justice is aimed at 
(re)building social capital, which is understood as the cornerstone of social cohesion. However, 
the relation between social capital and social cohesion is essentialised; higher degrees of social 
capital do not necessarily lead to greater social cohesion (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2017). As 
Putnam proposes, there are two different types of social capital: bonding and bridging social 
capitals (Putnum,2000). The former refers to the strengthening of intragroup social 
relationships, whereas the latter indicates fostering connections across the social groups 
(Patulny & Svendsen, 2007). Promoting bonding social capital within a community in the 
context of widespread hostility is not only extremely challenging, but also risky, as it may lead 
to intergroup antagonism. In relation to the concept of ungoverned spaces, bonding social 
capital can translate into local community solidarity but also into an antagonistic relationship 
between the government and its civilians. Therefore, one of the major challenges of local 
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justice mechanism is developing cross-cutting ties that assist in preventing the recurrence of 
both horizontal and vertical hostilities.  
2.3.2.6 Problematic Relationship Between Forgiveness and Reconciliation 
 
The preoccupation with forgiveness as a means to achieving reconciliation is further 
problematic. Forgiveness, in this thesis, refers to the overcoming of negative emotions, such as 
anger, resentment, hatred and indignation – which, incidentally, are natural responses to 
transgressions. From this perspective, a primary source of the damaged (political) relationships 
is the presence of widespread negative attitudes toward the horrific character of human rights 
abuses. Therefore, reconciliation in the aftermath of systematic wrongdoings can be achieved 
mainly through internal changes in citizens’ attitudes, particularly in victims. In other words, 
the restoration of relationships hinges on the capacity and willingness of victims to forgive 
their transgressors (Murphy, 2010: 9-10). However, this outlook on reconciliation is misguided 
and destructive because it overlooks the external structural changes that need to take place in 
order to end injustice, oppression and conditions that facilitate and support systematic 
wrongdoing (Murphy, 2010:11). Rather than negative emotions among affected populations, 
the root cause of damage to political relationships is violence and injustice during armed 
conflict and repressive rule. Hence, the post-conflict mechanisms that promote the act of 
resigning to resentment (forgiveness) among victims implicitly encourage the kind of 
capitulation that repressive regimes and violent actors were attempting to achieve in the first 
place. As Amery argues, resentment is ‘the weapon in the hands of the victims in their struggle 
against “cheap” reconciliation’ (Nadler, 2012:304, Amery, 1999). Resentment among victims 
reflects their profound commitment to the moral values that had been violated by the 
perpetrator. According to Murphy, resentment is, thus, an expression of ‘respect for self, for 
others, and for morality’ (Murphy, 1982:507). In this light, the major question is whether - and 
in what way - forgiveness is necessary for reconciliation, the prevention of conflict recurrence, 
and furthering the successful transition to democracy. The moral justifiability of pursuing 
reconciliation through forgiveness requires more than demonstrating that it is reasonable for a 
particular individual to forgive; it needs more complicated claim to answer why the community 
and state should exercise their power to encourage individuals to forgive in the name of 
promoting a societal good (Murphy, 2010: 13). 
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Section 2:  Ungoverned Spaces 
 
 
2.4 Transitional Justice in Ungoverned Spaces 
Apart from the issue of local justice having its limitations, another significant challenge to local 
justice is the particularities of the contexts in which transitional justice mechanisms operate. 
The contexts- in which societies attempt to address legacies of mass human rights abuses- are 
an integral to the concept of transitional justice. Such contexts can vary in terms of  institutional 
and political fragility, the nature of conflict and violence as well as underlying economic and 
social structural problems (Duthie, 2017:1). The fact that context varies is important since 
contextual factors have significant implications for responding to massive human rights 
violations. Contextual factors not only shape the design of transitional justice processes in each 
setting, but can also serve as constraints or obstacles for addressing past human rights abuses.  
In this thesis, the context in which the societies undertake transitional justice process is 
extremely complex, as it is classified as ‘ungoverned spaces’. These societies find themselves 
enduring insecure environments portrayed through a lack of genuine political settlements and 
government control including the presence of different types of violence that have gradually 
superseded armed fighting (Raeymaekers, et al., 2008:11). In this context, local modalities of 
dispute resolution and reconciliation start appealing to people. However, communities that look 
to adopt local justice mechanism will inevitably be confronted with two features of ungoverned 
spaces: the presence of multiple regulatory authorities and the prevalence of violence.  
2.4.1 The Presence of Multiple Regulatory Authorities  
 
‘Ungoverned space’ is a concept associated with the issue of state consolidation. A non-
functioning state has been identified as an underlying cause of internal conflict, since it creates 
enabling circumstances for non-state actors to exercise their authority in particular 
geographical areas where the state authority is weak or absent.  
Accordingly, the term ‘ungoverned space’ has been coined to describe a zone of contested 
authority; a site of potential innovation in governance and challenges the notion of zero-sum 
sovereignty (Beswick, 2009:337), leading to what Janet Roitman has introduced ‘the 
pluralization of regulatory authority’ (Roitman, 2005:18). Rather than the resistance and 
opposition, the emergence of innovative governance in ungoverned area demonstrates the great 
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deal of complicity and overlap between the state and non-state forms of political power 
(Raeymaekers et al, 2008); they are likely to cooperate in the management of local security, 
public services, and resources. Thus, the existence of non-state governance does not mean the 
disappearance of the state. Rather, the state - as a party to conflict - retains its status as a crucial 
actor in the social and political arena and constantly competes with non-state actors over rules, 
territories, populations and resources (Tull, 2003:431). With regard to the transitional justice 
processes, the state continues to serve a preponderant role both through its intervention(s) in 
the domain of conflict resolution, and in the brokerage of local decision-making processes 
through grassroot-level bureaucracies and everyday political interaction (Raeymaekers et al, 
2008).  
Hence, the term ‘ungoverned’ - rather than referring to the absence of the state - refers to the 
decline of formal political order in a particular area, which culminates in the distribution or 
reconfiguration of power and authority in which non-state actors act as substitutes for a central 
government exercising political domination (Tull, 2003:432). 
2.4.2 The Prevalence of Violence: Direct, Structural, and Cultural Violence 
 
The ungoverned space is, evidently, characterised by chronic political turmoil and violence. 
According to Galtung’s typology of violence, three distinct forms of violence are particularly 
pronounced in ungoverned areas: direct, structural and cultural1(Galtung, 1990). In other 
                                                 
1 Direct violence refers to the manifest presence of threats that threaten life and/or diminish 
one’s capacity to meet basic human needs; in other words, physical or behavioural violence 
(Galtung, 1990:292).  Structural violence represents conditions in which social institutions and 
systems perpetuate inequality and injustice. As Galtung argues, ‘Structural violence is silent, 
it does not show - it is essentially static, it is the tranquil waters... structural violence may be 
seen as about as natural as the air around us’ (Galtung, 1969:173) Thus, its devastating impacts 
are static, pervasive and without objects (or the object of structural violence may be persuaded 
not to perceive this at all). Cultural violence is the existence of prevailing or prominent social 







words, violence exists in both visible and invisible forms, causing suffering in everyday life. 
Owing to the presence of violence in several forms, ungoverned space can be defined as a ‘no 
war, no peace’ situation, whereby societies continue to be entangled in insecurity, chronic 
political turmoil and economic difficulties. The persistence of these factors can trigger conflict 
recurrence even if a ceasefire or peace agreement has already been signed by warring parties 
(Mac Ginty, 2010).  
 
2.4.2.1 Direct Violence in Ungoverned Spaces 
 
In the course of political contestation, armed fighting between government and armed groups 
(or among armed groups themselves) - for the sake of claiming local political control and 
legitimacy - is a recurring event in ungoverned areas. When a suspension of fighting is agreed 
upon by warring parties, there can be several reasons other than a political will to resolve the 
issues in dispute.  
Transitional justice, as a part of post-conflict reconstruction and development programmes, 
rests on the assumption that the signing of a peace agreement signals the official cessation of a 
conflict, and thus it is the optimal time for kick-starting the processes of transition and 
establishing of the rule of law. Nevertheless, this assumption has been discredited by the 
experiences of African conflicts in the 1990s. Beyond a dichotomy of war and peace, transition 
from war to peace is likely regarded as a ‘realignment of political interests and a readjustment 
of economic strategies rather than a clean break from violence to consent, from theft to 
production, or from repression to democracy’ (Berdal and Keen, 1997: 798). Accordingly, a 
halt in fighting can inaugurate a sustainable peace whereas its termination can also introduce a 
short interregnum until the outbreak of the next violent confrontation (Swart, 2011:144). In 
this sense, a pause in fighting does not necessarily mean that a conflict has reached its end; 
instead, the pause could be a strategic, maybe even subversive, and calculated choice 
deliberately taken by conflicting parties. So, while armed fighting may cease, the persistent 
and underlying antagonism between conflicting parties can continue in other forms, carrying 
with it the possibility of conflict recurrence.  
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2.4.2.2 Structural Violence in Ungoverned Spaces 
The mainstream explanation of internal conflict or civil war is hinged on the basis of the ‘weak 
state’ theory -  the dominant framework for understanding violent conflict globally since the 
end of World War II (Roessler, 2016:9). The deterministic logic of the framework is that a 
weak state is significantly more vulnerable to outbreaks of violent conflict since it lacks 
monopoly on legitimate violence and has feeble bureaucratic and administrative capacities 
(Roessler, 2016:9-10). Accordingly, the circumstance in which rebellion is materially feasible 
constitute a vital part in explaining the phenomenon of large-scale political violence (Collier 
et al., 2008:3).  
In an ungoverned space, where the government becomes a far less dominating and agenda-
setting actor, there exists a vacuum that allows local non-state actors (for example, 
businesspeople, militias, youngsters, customary authorities and civil society) to claim local 
political control and legitimacy (Raeymaekers et al, 2008: 9). The prevalence of conflict and 
violence, as a result of the weakness of the government and inherently authority contestation, 
creates a discontent with the government among affected populations. The antagonistic 
sentiment towards the government not only paves the way for a sense of reliance on armed 
groups as a legitimate provider of security and protection (instead of the state,) but also 
reinforces the popular support for armed groups, which can enable the groups to engage in non-
military domains of social life. The growing role of armed actors in both military and non-
military spheres is indicative of the increased militarisation that further results in the escalation 
of violence in localities. From this perspective, the weak state is understood as the underlying 
structural condition of conflict and violence in ungoverned areas.  
2.4.2.3 Cultural Violence in Ungoverned Spaces 
 
The possibility of the reproduction of violence in ungoverned spaces emanates arguably not 
only from the contestation of authority between state and non-state actors, but also from the 
perilous social transformation within a society whereby local armed and non-armed actors have 
developed their strategies in dealing with and adapting to existing conflicts. The civilian-
military/militia relations in the ungoverned areas are complex, since the two groups share living 
and socio-economic spaces. Civilians frequently encounter military and militia personnel in 
their everyday lives. Over time, while locals may develop their own psychological and/or 
cathartic risk-minimising strategies to survive and cope in the precarious socio-
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political environment, some turn to cooperating with the armed actors in order to profit from 
the conflict (Larmer et al., 2013:1).  
Under this light, the prolonged violent conflict fundamentally transforms social norms, modes 
of thinking, and political and economic structures in the conflict zone. The civilian-armed actor 
negotiation and collaboration as an everyday practice renders violence a phenomenon that is 
normalised, routinised and institutionalised - contributing to the (re)production of the dominant 
position of violent actors in the area, and of discourses that legitimise the use of violence 
(Verweijen, 2013:69). The complex relationships between soldiers and civilians, as well as the 
inherently vague delineation of violence and peace, present major challenges to transitional 
justice mechanisms when it comes to addressing past human rights violations and holding 
wrongdoers to account.  
2.5 Conclusion  
 
Local justice as an innovative ‘toolkit’ in transitional justice has gained its appeal largely 
because of the following reasons: its perceived legitimacy and, subsequently, its increased 
likelihood of effectiveness;  its ability to be more responsive to affected populations; its 
perceived higher likelihood of fostering reconciliation; and its potential to complement other 
transitional justice mechanisms. However, local justice has also generated controversy because 
of its limitations - namely, the fact that local justice is over-eulogised; the horizontalising of 
conflict, the issue of state-sponsored informalism; and local justice’s ill-suited approach to 
dealing with mass atrocities. Its approach is ill-suited largely since it does not consider the 
problematic relationship between social capital and social cohesion, as well as the relationship 
between forgiveness and reconciliation. In this sense, local justice presents both opportunities 
and constraints for responding to severe and massive human rights violations in localities.  
 
However, according to a comprehensive review of literature, local justice contains an enormous 
breadth of processes, stretching from state-sponsored, punitive, community-level systems such 
as Gacaca in Rwanda to more informal, dialogue-centred, society-led approaches in northern 
Uganda and Timor-Leste. Therefore, the major challenge of conceptualizing ‘local justice’ is 
the vast heterogeneity of practices deployed in different contexts, with greatly different 
consequences for the societies concerned, although available empirical evidence (in a highly 
contested literature) indicates that community-based approaches have considerably greater 
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benefits in some but not other locations. In other words, local justice practices are highly 
contextual and contingent. 
Ungoverned space, as the ‘transitional context’ in which a government lose its authority and 
control, is a contextual factor that justifies and legitimises the use of local justice mechanism 
in the area. However, the quintessential characteristics of an ungoverned space create 
challenges for local justice mechanisms in their pursuit of (restorative) justice and 
reconciliation. In the midst of myriad regulatory authorities, competing discourses over the 
legitimacy and morality of actors and their actions bear significant implications for transitional 
justice processes. The question becomes: who has legitimacy to exercise its power to provide 
‘justice’?. In addition, the prevalence of violence also affects its operation; that is to say, how 
do transitional justice mechanisms produce perceived justice and durable peace under the 
prevailing conditions of instability and violence?  
Taking the literature into account, local transitional justice mechanisms in the context of 
ungoverned space can have both positive and negative implications for the trajectory of 
conflict. Thus, the thesis will figure out whether these theoretical issues apply to the Kivu 












The Political Landscape in the Kivu Provinces: Contextual Framework 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Chapter 3 is divided into three parts. The first part presents the brief history of conflict and 
violence in the Kivu provinces, allowing us to understand the larger structural forces 
underlying the conflict and violence in the locality. The second part concerns the crises in the 
Kivus throughout the 2003-06 political transition, which created substantial barriers to 
achieving transitional justice goals. The last part demonstrates the history of the Barza Inter-
Communautaire and elaborates on how the institution responded to severe and mass human 
rights violations.  
 
3.2 A Brief History of Conflict and Violence in the Kivu Provinces 
 
The conflict and violence in the Kivu provinces in the eastern DRC has its roots in the Belgian 
colonial administration, which promoted the mass immigration of Rwandans and  manipulated 
ethnic power structures. After the independence in 1960, the social realities have evolved. 
Conflicts in the Kivus, which were rooted largely in local rural dynamics in the 1960s, have 
linked into national and regional politics.  
The advent of European imperialism radically transformed social structures in the Kivus. After 
the Belgian and German governments agreed on the borders of their African colonies in 1910, 
the Belgians - who gained control over the Kivus - immediately set about reorganising local 
power structures for their own purposes. The colonial government issued a decree recognising 
chieftaincies, but placed them under the control of Belgian administrative officials and the 
military. The Belgians reshaped customary rule by rendering it more hierarchical and 
regrouping small chieftaincies into new divisions called ‘sectors’ (Stearns, 2012:13). More 
importantly, the Belgians manipulated the ground rules by importing chieftains from certain 
groups considered as ‘indigenous’ to rule over local populations, comprised mostly of 
the Rwandophones. This decentralized despotism not only created artificial rules which was 
the material basis for the territorialisation of identity, but also allowed the colonial government 
to claim customary rule over ethnically diverse populations (Stearns, 2012:14).  
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The historical event that rendered a fundamental change in the Kivus was the mass immigration 
of over 150,000 Rwandans during the colonial rule since it marked the beginning of Rwandan 
domination in the locality. Owning to the growing number of Belgian settlers, there became an 
acute shortage of labour for their plantations and mining operations in the region. Thus, 
between  1937 and 1955, the Belgian colonial administration transplanted a large number of 
Hutu-Rwandans as a part of the Mission d’Immigration des Banyarwanda (MIB) – an 
undertaking aimed at managing the labour for the large colonial coffee, tea and cotton farms, 
and cattle ranches in the Kivu highlands (Vlassenroot, 2004:40-41). This mass immigration 
occurred on land controlled by ‘autochthonous’ ethnic groups: the Bahunde and Banyanga. 
Then, in 1959, the Rwandan Social Revolution caused the political turmoil and another mass 
migration of Tutsi-Rwandans to the Kivus (Vlassenroot, 2004:41). As a result, the composition 
of local populations in the Kivus became increasingly heterogenous, and within a decade, the 
so-called indigenous groups became minorities on their own land. Throughout the colonial 
period, the presence of ‘autochthonous’ and ‘immigrant’ communities living together in the 
same territories has led to regular local disputes over access to resources and control over land. 
However, such local disputes never produced serious levels of violence (Vlassenroot, 2004:41).  
The advent of democracy after the independence introduced new dynamics to the Kivus. The 
first democratic election triggered fears of ‘immigrant domination’ among those who consider 
themselves as indigenous whereas the Hutu and Tutsi immigrant populations deeply concerned 
about their citizenship (Stearns, 2012:21). These electoral politics began tightening links 
between political elites in Kinshasa and local populations in the Kivus through ethnic 
mobilization. The far-reaching changes occurred in the Mobutu’s regime where the 
politicisation of ethnicity became a central feature of his ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy. In the 
build-up to the 1990 election, local politicians in Mobutu’s patronage networks were 
encouraged to mobilize their followings on an ethnic basis to support his power position and 
prevent the formation of opposition forces (Vlassenroot, 2004:41). In this regard, Mobutu’s 
strategy reawakened long-standing hostilities between local ethnic communities.  
The politics of patrimonialism is the systematic exclusion that generates grievances among the 
marginalised non-indigenous populations: the Banyarwanda and then the Banyamulenge. Up 
until 1994, the Kinyarwanda-speaking residents of the eastern DRC were collectively known 
as the ‘Banyarwanda.’ Since the influx of Rwandans in 1994, the term ‘Banyamulenge’ has 
been used to refer to the Tutsi Congolese, who reside mostly in the South Kivu province. Under 
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the Mobutu’s regime, the non-indigenous populations experienced and suffered with the threat 
of expulsion, political marginalization, including socio-economic vulnerability. The status of 
Banyarwanda as Congolese citizens was highly politicized. In 1972, a nationality law was 
passed granting Zairian citizenship to the Banyarwanda. Subsequently, in 1981, the law 
retroactively retracted their status, leaving them faced with the extreme vulnerability and 
permanent insecurity (Joanne, 2012:2). Arguably, the political exclusion of the Banyarwanda 
under the Mobutu regime marked the beginning of conflicting identity formation in the Kivus. 
The climate of exclusion created by the central government and other groups solidified an 
ethnic consciousness and group identity among the Banyarwanda (Muraya & Ahere, 2014:14). 
But, collective identity built on a shared traumatic past can be destructive; descendants, who 
may share the psychological trauma that their ancestors suffered, can reactivate the trauma in 
order to justify their use of violence (Volkan, 2009).  
In the early 1990s, the hostilities between the so-called autochthonous and Banyarwanda 
communities were exacerbated by political events in neighbouring Burundi and Rwanda. Both 
events acted as catalysts for the crises that had long been in the region for many years (Prunier, 
2009). This was the critical moment that the Kivus were linked into regional politics.  In 1993, 
the assassination of Burundian President Ndadaye triggered an exodus of Burundian Hutu into 
South Kivu. Then, roughly 1.2 million Rwandan Hutus crossed into North and South Kivu 
following the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Joanne, 2012:2). Consequently, a large number of Hutu 
génocidaires and former Rwandan soldiers went into refugee camps in Uvira and Fizi (South 
Kivu province) – areas that had traditionally been home to Congolese Tutsi Banyamulenge. 
Under these circumstances, ‘indigenous’ communities took an opportunity to collude with 
Hutu refugees in order to drive out the Banyamulenge. However, the Banyamulenge refused 
to leave and appealed to Rwanda’s Tutsi-led government for assistance.   
 
In the meantime, Rwanda’s Tutsi-led government was attempting to manage cross-border 
attacks launched by Hutu génocidaires from refugee camps in the DRC. The coalescence of 
Banyamulenge and Rwandan communities led to the formation of an armed group known as 
the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), led by Laurent 
Désiré Kabila. The ADFL armed group was a diverse coalition of anti-Mobutuist rebel 
movements claiming to oppose Mobutu’s dictatorial regime. With massive supports, the AFDL 
was successful in overthrowing the Mobutu regime. The conflict between the ADFL and the 
Mobutu regime is known as the First Congo War (1996-1997). 
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After Mobutu was removed from power, relations between Kabila and the Tutsi-led Rwandan 
government began to deteriorate because of the prominence of Rwandans in the DRC’s 
national army and government. As a result, Kabila ordered all Rwandans and other foreign 
militaries to leave the DRC in 1998, with the hope of increasing his legitimacy domestically. 
In an act of retaliation to Kabila’s order, Rwanda and Uganda’s armies raided the eastern DRC 
region, claiming to secure their borders and to protect their interests in the mineral-rich eastern 
region. The mutual interest shared by Rwanda and Uganda led to the formation of the Rally for 
Congolese Democracy (RCD). Kabila then appealed to Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and, to a 
lesser extent, Sudan for military support. In a frightening echo of genocidal call, Kabila 
convinced Congolese citizens to attack their Tutsi neighbours. The war then entered a period 
of stalemate where several new armed groups formed to challenge Kabila’s authority, as well 
as to fight against foreign armed forces. The Mai Mai, the local and community-based militias 
in the Kivu provinces, was formed to protect their communities from rival armed groups, 
largely because there has been little government presence in remote areas. As a result of the 
proliferation of armed groups, the country became a patchwork of private fiefdoms controlled 
by a range of military groups for the outright privatisation of natural resources (Villa-Vicencio 
et al., 2005:45).  
The devastating five-year conflict (1998-2003), known as the Second Congo War, affected the 
lives of more than three million people in the manner of violence, disease and starvation (Di 
Piazza, 2008). During the war, the international community created a platform for all 
belligerents to negotiate so as to put an end to the conflict. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, 
for instance, was signed by conflicting parties in 1999, but was quickly broken due to a very 
fragile degree of trust among the signatories. After the assassination of Kabila in 2001, the 
peace process was again revived in 2002 through the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) held in 
South Africa. The political dialogue from the ICD led to the signing of the 2002 Global and 
Inclusive Agreement, which eventually concluded the stalemate of conflict and paved the way 
for the establishment of a transitional government in 2003. However, stability has remained 





3.3 The Kivus in the Transitional Period (2003-2006)  
The starting point of transitional justice efforts in the DRC can be dated to when the 2001 Inter-
Congolese Dialogue (ICD), the political negotiations, were completed at Sun City, South 
Africa, on 25 February 2002. The practice of transitional justice was discussed at the ICD in 
order to find a way to address these past atrocities, prosecute war criminals and prevent them 
from consolidate their grip on power, and redress the suffering of Congolese citizens.  Thus, 
the Commission on Peace and Reconciliation, as one of five transitional institutions, was set 
up and adopted two keys resolutions: the establishment of a truth and reconciliation 
commission, and prosecutions for war criminals through judicial systems (Borello, 2004: 14).  
However, the transitional arrangements held in the face of extreme challenges: an excessively 
prescriptive nature of the ICD, a lack of political will, fears of destabilisation, a scarcity of 
financial, human, and technical resources, and most significantly, the ongoing conflict in the 
Kivu provinces. The continuation of conflict in the Kivus can be attributed to the unsuccessful 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme, having been introduced in 
May 2004 (Borello, 2004: 14). In addition, many local administrative, juridical and military 
authorities - who had been in power during wartime and were alleged to be involved in human 
rights abuses – retained their power. The ICD deal allowed the RCD to keep control of the 
North Kivu province as the deal appointed Eugène Serufuli as governor and other RCD offices 
as regional military commanders. However, Mai Mai officers felt that they lacked political and 
military representation within the patronage-riddled hierarchy of the security forces, although 
they had received their share of seats and positions (Stearns, 2012: 35-36). In this way, the first 
sign of trouble already emerged at the very beginning of transitional processes. Predictably, 
these unresolved matters would aggravate security situations on the ground and pose serious 
obstacles to reaching transitional justice objectives.  
3.3.1 The Political Stalemate  
After the Second Congo War, the political climate of the Kivu provinces was thrown into flux 
soon after the inception of the transition process. The most significant conflict in the midst of 
the transitional justice process was the dispute between Kabila and the Rally for Congolese 
Democracy-Goma (RCD-G) – an organisation whom many believed to be a puppet for the 
Rwandan government. The dispute between the two was a result of disagreement within the 
transitional government over power-sharing in the army and the administration (International 
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Crisis Group, 2005:1-2). In February 2004, a violent confrontation between the Congolese 
national army and the RCD-G erupted in Bukavu - the capital of the South Kivu province - and 
triggered a series of armed conflicts in the region. The political transition was now on the brink 
of collapse. The struggle, which had devastating effects, reoccurred in May 2004. Supported 
by Rwanda, Laurent Nkunda marched his troops to Bukavu, claiming to protect the Tutsi 
population from a national army-led genocide. However, there was no evidence of genocidal 
intent. Moreover, Nkunda’s troops committed gross human right violations under the siege of 
Bukavu (Stearns, 2012:37). In November 2004, the already-volatile security situation in the 
region was intensified by the interference of the Rwandan government, claiming to pursue the 
Hutu extremist FDLR. Rwanda’s military incursion provoked divisions within the RCD-G 
between those who supported the transitional government, led by Serufuli - a governor of North 
Kivu -  and the dissidents, headed by Nkunda. As a result, fighting  erupted between the Forces 
Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), the new national army, and the 
dissidents in North Kivu in late 2004 (International Crisis Group, 2005:2). 
On the one hand, the ongoing fighting in the Kivu provinces was closely linked to the political 
impasse in the capital, where conflicting parties negotiated a solution to resolving political 
differences (International Crisis Group, 2005:i). Different parties attempted different strategies 
- particularly militaristic strategies - that entailed (re)positioning themselves and competing for 
the access to resources. On the other hand, the ICD power-sharing agreements were significant 
contributors to the reproduction of violence. The institutionalisation of power-sharing as an 
instrument of peace-making created a degree of predictability for politically ambitious 
entrepreneurs to trade off their military victory for a share of state power (Tull & Mehler, 2005) 
– inadvertently bestowing more power to insurgents in ungoverned spaces.  
3.3.2 The Manipulation of Ethnicity  
The series of conflicts in the Kivu provinces during the transition period reflects both political 
battles between the former government and RCD’s rebel leaders in Kinshasa, and local 
conflicts between the Banyarwanda (supporters of the RCD) and the non-Banyarwanda 
(opponents of the RCD) in the Kivus. These conflicts were fundamentally driven by 
xenophobic and ethnical ideologies promoted by each party for its own political gain 
(International Crisis Group, 2005:8).   
 31 
The tensions reached a climax in December 2004, when a march of Banyarwanda in Goma 
protesting the mass deployment of government troops in North Kivu clashed with a counter-
march organized by non-Banyarwada (Clark, 2008:5). Governor Serufuli, a Hutu RCD-G 
official in North Kivu, and other Banyarwanda leaders manipulated existing ethnic tensions by 
constructing a concept called ‘Rwandaphonie’; a political ideology that advocates for the 
building of Rwandan solidarity among Hutu and Tutsi populations in the Kivus. They claimed 
that the Banyarwandans were facing with exclusion and discrimination and therefore needed 
to protect themselves from government oppression. Since early 2005, the RCD-G troops 
redeployed to North Kivu have regularly attacked non-Banyarwanda people.  
At the same time, Kabila was promoting a xenophobic ideology depicting the RCD-G as a 
puppet of Kigali and as a major security threat to the country (International Crisis Group, 2005). 
Moreover, the existing discourses of ‘autochthony’ in the Kivus - centred around the notions 
of ethnicised territory and citizenship, as well as memories of massacre and other violence that 
people ascribe primarily to Rwanda-backed rebel groups- were instrumental in serving non-
Banyarwanda militias. The Mai-Mai groups in particular were able to mobilise civilian support 
for defending ancestral lands and state territory against the ‘foreign enemy’ (Hoffmann & 
Verweijen, 2018).  
3.3.3 The Proliferation of Armed Groups 
The number of armed actors involved in the Congolese conflict has proliferated since 1998, 
largely because of the fragmentation of the RCD rebel groups and the growing resistance to 
the RCD in the region (Vlassenroot, 2004:51). Armed fighting against Kabila’s regime and 
hostilities between Rwanda and Uganda led to a reconfiguration of the rebellion; the RCD-G 
became a Rwanda-controlled section, while the RCD-ML became a Uganda-commanded unit. 
Moreover, the presence of the RCD in the region not only mounted urban resistance led by 
civil society and church leaders, but also provoked the formation of community-based militias 
such as the Mai Mai (Vlassenroot, 2004:51). The aim of the Mai Mai groups was to protect 
their communities from rival armed groups, since government presence had been virtually non-
existent in many remote areas. However, the Kinshasa government also labelled Mai Mai 
groups as security threats to the central government because of its growing numbers (Wambua-
Soi, 2017). The Kivu provinces was divided into four politico-military sections controlled by 
the national army (FARDC), Mai Mai, and the two foreign-sponsored armed groups, the RCD-
G and RCD-ML.  
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In light of the newly localised configuration of power, foreign actors - including both 
transnational economic and crime networks – found opportunities to maximise their profit from 
the lucrative trade in natural resources through the proxy structure of exploitation, by 
supporting local warlords and armed groups in the Kivus (Vlassenroot, 2008:5).The 
cooperation between local and foreign actors gave rise to the emergence of smaller armed 
groups that would take their own shares of the profits. As a result of the increasing engagement 
of lower-level political and military actors in militarised politics, the armed group landscape 
of the Kivu provinces became increasingly fragmented. Large rebel movements tended to 
disappear and scatter, leading to the emergence of smaller armed groups (Verweijen & 
Wakenge, 2015). The proliferation of armed actors significantly hindered the political 
processes that aimed to convince armed groups to lay down their weapons. The logic of 
comparative advantage dictates that the armed mobilisation of one group stimulates the 
mobilisation of others considerably, leading to a self-perpetuating upward spiral of violence in 
the Kivus.  
3.3.4 The Emergence of a New Order in the Kivus 
The prolonged state of disorder in the Kivus provided fertile ground for the formation of new 
patterns of social and economic control which could enable the perpetuation of violence and 
conflict (Vlassenroot, 2004:53, Adams & Bradbury, 1995). Owing to the declining competence 
of the central government, local leaders and warlords attempted to (re)assert control over their 
local populations by performing the functions of the state; this included providing protection 
to their populations and collecting taxes (Jackson, 2003:137-139). War became an opportunity 
for profit and power, where local armed actors would create alternative systems of economic 
control and protection. Traditional trading mechanisms evolved into ‘military commercialism’, 
whereby natural resources became lucrative tradable commodities in the market. The natural 
resources were controlled by armed groups with the cooperation of local civilians. In these 
precarious conditions, options were limited, and local populations needed to adopt risk-
minimising strategies which included participating in the operation of militarised predation led 
by armed groups and working in settings or markets controlled by militarised forces 
(Vlassenroot, 2004:54). The everyday cooperation between armed and non-armed actors 
(which could be either coerced or voluntary) rendered the distinction between war crimes and 
peace vague and obscure. Violence became normalised, routinised and, moreover, 
institutionalised, resulting in the persistence of violent conflict in the Kivus.   
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Long-standing armed fighting creates new social realities and power dynamics. These 
emerging patterns of social and economic relations are destructive because violent actors are 
the ones that typically find themselves in dominant positions of power, while civilians are 
subordinate to them. Accordingly, to preserve this asymmetric relationship, armed actors 
typically wield their influence over civilians through the recourse of violence and by instilling 
fear (Beswick, 2009:339). Additionally, due to the presence of multiple armed militias, the 
competition among them to establish their authority over territories is likely to be intense and 
leads to periodic outbursts of armed fighting.  
3.4 The History and Functions of the Barza Inter-Communautaire 
 
3.4.1 The Rise and Fall of sthe Barza Inter-Communautaire 
Transitional justice processes in the DRC were launched despite the fact that violence and 
conflict were continuing to rage the country - especially in the Kivu provinces in the eastern 
DRC. Against this backdrop, transitional mechanisms were challenged by a myriad of 
dilemmas and obstacles, stemming from complex conflict situations and the politics of 
transition. Evidently, state-led transitional justice mechanisms had limited impacts on 
transforming the society. The failure of formal transitional justice mechanisms in responding 
to serious human right abuses led to a growing interest amongst locals in searching justice and 
peace through their local justice mechanisms.  
From the outset, the Barza Inter-Communautaire operated as a provincial branch of the 
Commission de Pacification et de Concorde (CPC), established by Kabila’s government in 
1997. In the wake of long-standing ethnic tensions in the eastern DRC, Kabila established a 
branch of the CPC in Goma in late 1997 so as to monitor peacebuilding process throughout the 
eastern region (Clark, 2008:6). The CPC was a commission comprised of two elder 
representatives from each of the nine ethnic groups in North Kivu, who travelled throughout 
the territory conducting conflict resolution and peacebuilding programmes. However, the 
commission could operate only in the territories of Masisi, Rutshuru, Beni and Lubero because 
other areas like Walikale were controlled by the RCD (Life and Peace Institution, 2001:43). 
The CPC established ‘peace cells’ in each territory in which local esteemed persons convened 
a meeting between leaders of conflicting ethnic groups, convinced them to surrender their 
weapons, and reintegrated them into their communities (Pole Institute, 2000:3). In this manner, 
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the CPC contributed significantly to peacebuilding efforts in eastern DRC as it created inter-
communal discussions which had previously been impossible.  
In 1998, after a series of negotiations, the Barza was re-established as an independent local 
justice institution with the objective of consolidating the work of the CPC. In general, these 
two institutions were similar in their operation and goals. The major difference was that the 
CPC was a government-led institution while the Barza was perceived as a community-led 
justice mechanism that was independent and non-partisan (Clark, 2008:6). Local community 
leaders attempted to distance themselves from any potential links with Kinshasa in order to 
render the Barza more credible to the conflicting parties in the region. Owing to its impressive 
success, the Barza was formally recognised as a part of the national strategy for reconciliation 
in 2003 (Villa-Vicencio et al., 2005:58) 
The Barza had successfully managed to create a platform for interethnic dialogue in North 
Kivu between 1998 and early 2004 before it was plagued by two major challenges which 
eventually led to its collapse in 2005: the politics of transition and the increase in ethnic 
hostility throughout the pre-election.  
Firstly, the Barza had long been accused of being hijacked, controlled and influenced by 
political elites from Kinshasa and from the locality itself, which significantly undermined the 
Barza’s legitimacy and effectiveness (Kamwimbi, 2008:366). The emergence of the Barza 
during times when the RCD took political and military control over almost areas of North Kivu 
generated a distrust among civilians. The Barza was perceived as a means for the RCD to 
exercise their sympathetic leadership at the grassroot level. The problem of intimate links 
between the Barza and the RCD leadership was illustrated by the failure of establishing the 
Barza model outside the North Kivu (Clark, 2008:8).   
Secondly, interethnic disputes manifested within the Barza institution itself; there was a deep-
seated division between the Banyarwanda and the non-Banyarwanda people. The major 
concern among many non-Banyarwanda leaders was the lack of endeavour from their 
Banyarwanda (Hutu and Tutsi) colleagues to counter the rise of Rwandaphonie and to stop 
violent acts against non-Banyarwanda civilians in Rutshuru and Masisi in 2004 (Clark, 
2008:10). In the atmosphere of suspicion, non-Banyarwanda leaders renounced the Barza, 
leading to the collapse of the institution in 2005.  
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3.4.2 The Functions of the Barza Inter-Communautaire 
The origins of the Barza lie in traditional dispute resolution practices that were performed in 
the eastern DRC region called ‘Baraza’, which refers to a place where kings and community 
elders would meet to resolve conflicts and address concerns in the community before they 
escalated to more serious conflict (Villa-Vicencio et al., 2005:58). Examples of disputes that 
had regularly been resolved by the Barza included conflicts over land and resources; speech 
and literature inciting ethnic hatred; social disturbances resulting from the influx of refugees 
into the region; and crimes - such as nocturnal arrests, kidnappings and the illegal detention of 
civilians - perpetrated by state police and rebel groups (Clark, 2008:7).  
Based on restorative justice and the rule of law, the Barza functions to reconcile antagonistic 
ethnic groups with one another. The institution provides a platform for perpetrators and victims 
to engage with one another through dialogue and rituals. The fellowship usually takes place 
under a tree, where everyone shares a meal together and drinks from the same calabash (Villa-
Vicencio et al., 2005:59). Moreover, other community members are also invited to participate 
in the process. In this manner, the Barza provides an opportunity for victims, perpetrators, and 
the entire community to mediate and seek a sustainable solution to the conflict together.  
The Barza functions on three main principles: resolving disputes, preventing violent conflict, 
and healing suffering after conflict (Clark, 2008:6). With regards to dispute resolution, victims 
are granted an opportunity to share their experience of suffering in front of mediators and 
perpetrators. Then, perpetrators are requested to explain the rationale behind their actions. 
Throughout the process, victims can ask for reparation, if they wish, while perpetrators have 
the opportunity to be accepted back into the community. Accordingly, the ceremony entails 
elements of the acknowledgement of guilt (truth-telling) and the virtue of forgiveness – both 
of which are expected to improve the relationship between the antagonistic parties, as well as 
to reactivate communal solidarity. With regards to preventing conflict, the Barza counteracts 
aggressive attitudes and incendiary statements that certain ethnic groups may express towards 
others. For instance, the institution denounces politicians perceived to be attempting to stir up 
ethnic hatred for political gain (Clark, 2008:6). Lastly, healing entails material and symbolic 
reparations to victims done through traditional rituals.  
The Barza, however, was not designed to adjudicate serious crimes against humanity, so its 
members would usually transfer such crimes to a customary court – the lowest level of civilian 
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courts in the Congolese judicial system. In other words, the Barza has a mediation function, 
while the task of punishment falls under the jurisdiction of a customary court. Nonetheless, 
there is no concrete distinction between the jurisdiction of the Barza and customary courts 
since both institutions deal with community-based disputes (Clark, 2008:7). 
3.5 Conclusion  
The conflict in the Kivu provinces in the eastern DRC has its origins in the Belgian colonial 
administration, where the decentralised despotism created artificial rules that served as the 
material basis for the territorialisation of ethnic identity. The advent of democracy in 1960, 
after independence, introduced new dynamics to the Kivus. This was the critical moment that 
the Kivus started becoming entangled in national and regional politics in which the problem of 
state weakness and the self-seeking interests of elites reinforced ethnic hostilities that has long 
been in the region since the colonial era. Accordingly, the potent blend of ethnic discrimination, 
state weakness and elite interests is arguably the underlying structural force behind the 
instability and violence in the Kivus.  
However, the very nature of the Congolese conflict is intriguing; new driving forces have 
constantly been emerging to replace the original sources of conflict, rendering the conflict 
incessant. The structural elements driving the Congo Wars – namely, the weak state, corruption 
and kleptocracy, the marginalisation and disenfranchisement of communities, and ethnic 
divisions (Muraya & Ahere, 2014) – get overshadowed by local and regional causes of conflict. 
Since 1996, local conflicts over political power have increasingly become self-seeking in 
nature, parallel to national tracks. The strategic and state-oriented agendas of conflict have 
been replaced by individual-oriented agendas, leading to a fragmentation of the politico-
military landscape (Vlassenroot, 2004:50-51). 
In this way, an explanation based on static conditions becomes irrelevant in the face of the 
multifaceted conflict(s) in the Kivus, since it does not account for social and political dynamics 
in the localities. In other words, the relationship between static structural conditions and armed 
conflict is not linear, but is mediated by many other variables. Unpacking the dynamic 
processes within the weak state paradigm can enhance our understanding of the evolution of 
conflict in the Kivus; more precisely, how underlying structural conditions were stimulated 
into explosive political violence by the transitional justice processes.  
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Transitional justice mechanisms were established under prevailing conditions of instability and 
violence in the Kivu provinces. The Barza operation during armed conflict had both positive 
and negative effects on the localities that it intended to serve. On the one hand, the Barza had 
a pacifying effect on armed conflict, and was a potential tool for conflict resolution and 
prevention. On the other hand, it had the potential to intensify conflict, which translated into a 
higher likelihood of conflict recurrence. Accordingly, chapters 4 and 5 will examine how the 















The Contributions of the Barza Inter-Communautaire 
4.1 Introduction 
 
What is so remarkable about the Barza is that it managed to make major contributions to peace 
and justice processes in the Kivu provinces when state-led mechanisms had failed – all in a 
volatile climate of armed conflict. Even though the enduring conflict in the region posed 
serious challenges and jeopardised the entire transitional justice process, Barza leaders went to 
tremendous lengths to ensure that peace and justice proceedings advanced.  
This chapter will unpack and analyse the positive contributions of the Barza during a violent 
and volatile transition period. With regards to the theoretical literature, four contributions of 
local justice have been highlighted by scholars: perceived legitimacy and increased 
effectiveness; responsiveness; reconciliation; and the potential to complement other 
transitional justice mechanisms. These contributions can be seen through three positive features 
of the Barza that will be elaborated on: (1) the inclusion of violent non-state actors to 
transitional justice processes; (2) reconciliation between ethnic groups; and (3) complements 
to other transitional justice mechanisms.  
4.2 Inclusion of Violent Non-State Actors  
In consideration of the nature of ungoverned spaces, the Kivu provinces can be viewed as a 
patchwork controlled by different armed groups besides the state. Over time, protracted violent 
conflict has generated a trend towards the proliferation of non-state armed actors. Arguably, 
the growing number of small armed groups can be attributed to a desperate need for protection 
at the grassroots level. Once the state can no longer guarantee the security of its citizens, 
security and protection become a subject of negotiation between rebels and local social forces 
(Vlassenroot, 2008:10). Accordingly, the decision of civilians to negotiate with rebels is a 
tactical one; civilians negotiate with rebels for the purpose of developing a coping mechanism 
to assist them in managing their fears of insecurity and anarchy. However, in most cases, the 
negotiation is conducted in an apparently asymmetric power setting, whereby violent actors 
use protection mechanisms as an apparatus to control over local populations as well as to 
exploit local resources. The security provided by ‘protection forces’ is granted only on 
 39 
condition that taxes and supports are paid to them. In this sense, a strategy of protection led by 
non-state armed groups is typically adopted in the form of predation. Armed groups (in 
complicity with local political elites) use force and fear to maintain their status ‘relevance’ to 
civilians – albeit ultimately for their own political benefit. Hence, in situations where a 
multiplicity of non-state armed groups are involved in a violent conflict, it is imperative to 
include violent non-state groups as agents in the transitional justice processes.  
One particular argument purports that instead of focusing solely on the prosecution of non-
state armed actors who commit atrocities, ‘inclusion’ should entail an acknowledgement of 
ownership and responsibility from non-state armed groups in justice and peace processes; this 
necessitates documenting their political outlooks and connecting them to the transitional justice 
processes (Bellal, 2017). The rationale behind this argument is that in ungoverned areas a 
system of accountability that is based entirely on a state-centric paradigm tends to fall short in 
dealing with mass atrocities, as the state is only a single actor out of a myriad of violent actors. 
The state also does not possess moral superiority over other actors. Thus, the representation of 
all rebels as ‘terrorists’, regardless of their nature and political motivations, not only creates 
difficulties for the production of justice and peace, but also assists a repressive regime in 
consolidating its grip on power domestically. 
Formal transitional justice mechanisms were manipulated by the Kabila-led government to 
serve its own ends; that is, prosecuting its own military and political opponents. For example, 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted Thomas Lubanga and Germain Katanga – two 
Congolese rebel leaders - whereas Mathieu Chui, a senior commander in a Congolese army in 
Ituri, was acquitted without a clear explanation for public why he was not being pursued by the 
Court (CICC, n.d.). Moreover, domestic trials - largely led by the Congolese military courts – 
rarely imposed charges against government officials and soldiers who were alleged to be 
involved in serious human rights violations. The Congolese military courts, whose purpose was 
to discipline soldiers for their military infractions, had been exploited by the central 
government as a tool of repression of its own dissents (Borello, 2004: 22). There was thus 
minimal room for non-state armed actors to participate meaningfully in the national transitional 
justice processes, since they were usually identified by the government as suspects of serious 
crimes, ultimately disenfranchising them from the processes. The lack of faith from non-state 
armed groups in the transitional justice institutions, which were inherently biased against them, 
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resulted in their abandonment of the transitional justice processes and in their return to 
violence.   
In contrast to the formal transitional justice procedures, the Barza had closer connections to 
local political leaders, especially the RCD leaderships. They met regularly to discuss problems 
between ethnic communities in North Kivu (Clark, 2008:8). The fruitful discussions between 
the Barza’s members and the non-state (violent) actors had the potential to create a common 
understanding of the roots of and the motivations behind armed fighting, resulting in a 
(potential) revival of trust among the parties. Considering that the violent conflict of the past 
had its roots in the failure of people to recognise the common humanity and worth of others 
(Schaap, 2004:524), the interethnic dialogue arranged by the Barza aided in providing 
perpetrators with a sense of recognition of human dignity. Such political dialogue not only 
created a shared horizon that past wrongs ought to be condemned, but also inaugurated new 
civic relationships (Schaap, 2004). Further, the Barza allowed the voices and stories of victims, 
which had long been silenced, to be brought forward to the public at large. Thus, the interethnic 
dialogue held by the Barza can be described as a stepping stone to reconciliation in the locality. 
The Barza was proactive in its approaches to conflict resolution. Barza leaders, on a number 
of occasions, arranged meetings with the several warring parties. For instance, in 2006, the 
Barza initiated a meeting with the Army Chief-of-Staff in Goma in order to find a resolution 
to the violent conflict between the FARDC and armed militia led by Commander Laurent 
Nkunda – a key figure in the violent conflicts in the Kivus since transition (Kamwimbi, 
2008:367). Moreover, the Barza leaders also sent delegates to Kampala to address their 
concerns to President Yoweri Museveni about crimes carried out by Ugandan-backed rebel 
groups in North Kivu (Clark, 2008:7). Accordingly, to a certain degree, the Barza’s operations 
had a pacifying effect on conflict in the region. The decrease in conflict intensity could help to 
minimize the significance of violent non-state actors, as the ‘protection providers’, towards 
civilians.   
The Barza holds the record for the most successful number of mediations between warlords 
and the transitional government, as well as between armed groups and communal leaders 
(Kilaya, 2016:36). Connecting non-state armed groups to local peace and justice processes - 
for example, peace settlement, truth-seeking and accountability initiatives – can considerably 
enhance the legitimacy and transparency of institutions, especially in ungoverned areas like the 
Kivu provinces. That is to say, local justice mechanisms send out the crucial message to local 
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military and political elites that they are not government-invented institutions, and are therefore 
impartial to rebel groups. Furthermore, given that non-state armed groups can also take a 
positive role in transitional justice and peace processes, their participation could help advance 
the capacity of the mechanism(s) to address systematic human rights violations.  
4.3 Reconciliation among Ethnic Communities 
In a gesture of reconciliation, the Barza bore its relevance to local norms and needs. Essentially, 
the popular support for Barza-led reconciliation efforts is reflective of local perceptions of 
justice. For example, in Dunn’s interview, Pierre - a South Kivutian man – explains his 
understanding of the difference between ‘justice’ and ‘reconciliation’. Pierre states that, 
‘justice means sentencing the presumed offender [whereas] reconciliation means bringing two 
sides together to help them resolve the disputes peacefully and fairly’ (Dunn, 2013:99-100). 
Furthermore, within the confines of ethnic violence, civilians tend to prefer a dispute settlement 
through reconciliation in order to coexist with each other peacefully. As Evelyne, another of 
Dunn’s interviewees, explains, ‘For me, the [state] justice approach leads to jail sentences and 
turns the parties into permanent enemies. Reconciliation leads to renewed relationships and 
love between parties’ (Dunn, 2013: 95).  In this regard, the Barza has the potential to appeal to 
a greater audience, contributing a greater degree of legitimacy, and – consequently - the 
prospect of successful reconciliation.  
During the transitional period, ethnic violence in the Kivus erupted in the context of communal 
disputes that had been manipulated and politicised by political and military elites since the 
colonial era. The two Congo wars have produced irreconcilably opposed ethnic identities that 
have bitterly divided local populations along ethnic lines. One prominent point of contention 
between different ethnic groups has been that of access to land. The decades of violent conflict 
in the region have created a climate of distrust and deepened antagonistic sentiments, which 
souring interpersonal and social relations, and culminating in the collapse of ‘social norms, 
values and institutions that have regulated and coordinated collective actions for the well-being 
of the community’ (Murithi, 2008:17). The breakdown of trust in the Kivus not only stimulates, 
but also sustains ethnic conflict.  
Thus, in a climate with long-standing conflict where parties had not only suffered from direct 
violence, but also suffered from deeply damaged social relationships, (re)building trust and 
constructing newly reconciled identities became two major tasks of the Barza in its 
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reconciliation project. Interethnic reconciliation led by the institution operated on the basis of 
relational and identity-based perspectives of reconciliation. On the one hand, the relational 
perspective attributes conflict’s intractability to distrust and negative perceptions of the 
adversary, and thus the pursuit of reconciliation is to (re)build relations of trust and positive 
perceptions of ‘the other’. On the other hand, the identity-related perspective sees 
reconciliation as premised on a departure from antagonistic identities to the collective identities 
of each of the parties to conflict (Nadler, 2012: 294). Hence, the expected outcome of 
interethnic reconciliation is trustworthy and positive relations between ethnic groups that enjoy 
relatively secure identities.  
4.3.1 Relational Perspective on Reconciliation: (Re)building Trust  
Several Kivutians cited that distrust, as a result of years of warfare and instability, persisted in 
their societies, and that relationships between local people continued to deteriorate (Dunn, 
2013:93-94). Living in a state of constant fear, on the one hand, renders local civilians 
vulnerable to mobilisation from armed groups which represent themselves as ‘protection 
forces’ following a particular ethnic agenda and interests. On the other hand, it can cultivate a 
profound desire to restore trust with one’s neighbours through the reconciliation process. The 
popular support for the Braza in North Kivu during the transition (Clark, 2008; Kiyala, 2016), 
and in South Kivu after transition (Dunn, 2013), is indicative of the desire of locals to reconcile 
with their neighbours.  
As a traditional mechanism of conflict resolution, the Barza relied heavily on the practices of 
truth-telling and forgiveness, as well as a mediation mechanism led by the commission of 
elders and notables. Then, the Barza’s meaning would be solidified through reconciliation rite 
as a mark of the termination of disputes. The processes of truth-telling (or apology) and 
forgiveness are performed as social exchanges based on the victim’s and perpetrator’s needs 
to the extent that reconciliation can be achieved once victims’ need for empowerment and 
perpetrators’ need for social acceptance are met by the conflicting parties in an interactive 
manner. (Nadler, 2012: 298-299). Through an ‘apology-forgiveness’ cycle, when perpetrators 
apologise and seek forgiveness from the victims, they grant the formerly powerless victims the 
power to decide whether they wish to grant forgiveness. Arguably, this can be seen as 
empowering and equalizing experiences for victims and the payment of moral debt on the side 
of perpetrators that bestows them a chance to gain (re)acceptance into the moral community to 
which they belong (Nadler, 2012: 299). Then, the ritual of reconciliation can be viewed as a 
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platform for victims and perpetrators to make a ‘promise’ to live together with peaceful 
manners and not to repeat the offence. Such a promise generally helps to foster a greater sense 
of security and trust, and facilitates further psychological healing (Staub, et al., 2005:134). 
Hence, because it operates in accordance with basic needs of victim and perpetrator, as well as 
local norms, the Barza-led reconciliation process undoubtedly has the capacity to achieve 
interethnic reconciliation.  
In addition, the Barza also involved some reparative and retributive measures which had the 
potential to reduce resentment among victims and to allow perpetrators to contribute to their 
communities through community service(s) as a primary sanction. In this manner, the Barza 
played a critical role in the revival of civil trust in affected communities. However, it is vital 
to note that the work of the Barza was only aimed at reviving horizontal relationships among 
civilians that had been damaged by long-standing conflict, rather than vertical relationships 
between the state and civilians.  
4.3.2 Identity-Based Perspectives on Reconciliation: Constructing Newly 
Reconciled Identities 
In the Kivu provinces, the media - particularly radio broadcasting – had been an effective tool 
for warring parties to propagate messages of hate and ethnic division, in turn mobilising local 
populations (Vollhardt et al., 2007). These hate radio stations not only created, but also 
sustained ethnic-based antagonism. They circulated hate speech which was constructed by 
unsubstantiated and intense negative views of particular ethnic community so as to strengthen 
and politicise ethnic identities, arouse animosity, and encourage violent activities against the 
targeted groups (Tsesis 2002). Having awareness of the violence that the media was stoking, 
the Barza aimed to counter ‘negative values’, referring to incendiary attitudes and statements 
against other ethnic groups, in local communities (Clark, 2008:6). Combatting such sentiments 
could prevent growing hostilities and violent conflict. The Barza’s remarkable success in 
averting ethnic violence was acknowledged by the European Union, who commended the 
institution on its ability to deter authorities and armed groups from attempting to mobilise 
civilians along ethnic lines (European Union: 2001). 
In order to overcome the legacy of identity-based violence, the Barza not only challenged 
existing antagonistic sentiments, but also endeavoured to forge new identities that would 
embrace diversity. In post-conflict realities, parties to interethnic conflict frequently compete 
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for the role of victim. Each party sees its opponent as responsible for initiating conciliatory 
post-violence exchange by apologising and seeking forgiveness, whereas the parties perceive 
themselves as passive victims. The reluctance to acknowledge responsibility for having caused 
suffering can be explained by the fact that interethnic conflict is usually symmetrical in nature, 
where warring parties typically inflict suffering on their foes. More importantly, the position 
of perpetrators in post-conflict society is socially vulnerable; they are likely to be perceived as 
morally deficient, leading to social exclusion. Victims, on the contrary, possess a psychological 
safe haven and are given an elevated moral status, over their perpetrators (Nadler, 2012:300). 
Accordingly, the competition for the role of victim is, arguably, one of the most prominent 
features of a post-conflict society, which contributes to the likelihood that a conflict will 
become intractable.  
In support of the reconciliation effort, the Barza -  together with its partners –commenced its 
work of memorialisation. They worked with affected communities, organised inter-ethnic 
group activities, and conducted research so as to appropriate the shared memories of violence 
and injustices among affected communities – for the purpose of creating a new reconciled 
identity and for (re)building harmony (Tegera et al, 2004).  The Barza’s attempt to conduct the 
‘memory work’ among affected ethnic communities helped to end the cycle of competitive 
victimhood and replaced the toxic cycle with collective memories of past atrocities. So, instead 
of identifying affected populations as either victims or perpetrators, local civilians – who 
suffered a long history of violence and fragmentation of their communities  - could share their 
traumatic memories as victims of structural violence. Daily insecurities and hardships had 
plagued their lives, and had often pushed them into moral dilemmas; for instance, civilians 
were frequently placed in positions of having to choose to participate in armed operations or 
engage in illegal activities for the purpose of survival. Therefore, the construction of secure 
and collective identities in post-conflict societies not only dissuades the guilty wrongdoers 
from defending themselves for the sake of securing their moral status, but also reduces victims’ 
desires for revenge.  
Julie, a South Kivutian, explained how the Barza had encouraged a feeling of empathy for 
others, which enabled reconciliation to become possible on the ground:  
‘…at the Barza, you are required to think not only about your own problems, but also 
the problems of other parties. In that way, you can listen to each other and see what can 
be done to resolve the issue, That’s why I prefer the Barza’ (Dunn, 2013:96).  
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4.4 Complements to Other Transitional Justice Mechanisms 
 
Given the failure of  formal mechanisms in responding to serious crimes in the Kivu provinces, 
the Barza stepped in to carry on local peace and justice processes. The Barza, as a traditional 
transitional justice institution, not only fulfilled the tasks that state-led transitional justice 
institutions could not accomplish, but also supported other informal transitional justice 
mechanisms led by local non-government organisations (NGOs).  
4.4.1 Reintegration of Demobilised Combatants 
 
In the Kivus, auto-demobilised soldiers had faced several challenges when returning to their 
homes. These difficulties included being rejected by their communities, struggling to find 
economic opportunities to earn their life, being isolated and dealing with personal trauma by 
themselves. Without effective accountability and reintegration mechanisms, ex-combatants are 
inclined to reengage in different sorts of violence and their returns to communities tend to 
create tensions that can escalate into full-blown communal conflict with other community 
members. Under the light of struggling implementation of the DDR program and its limited 
impacts on human security in the Kivu provinces (Boshoff, 2007), the Barza with its restorative 
potentials made a substantial contribution in facilitating the transition of ex-combatants to 
civilian life and family reunification. The work of the Barza thus played an integral part in the 
demilitarisation process in the Kivu localities.  
The Barza’s principle of ‘Accountability through Acknowledgement’ opened possibilities of 
attaining justice in times of instability. The Barza held former soldiers accountable without  
(re)victimising them, paving the way for reconciliation and reintegration under complex 
circumstances. With regards to perpetrators, the Barza, as a grassroots-level platform for 
establishing accountability, functioned as a ‘customary tribunal’ that held perpetrators 
accountable for violating codes of ancestral and social norms. Examples of code violations 
included engaging in sexual relations with persons under the age of 15, the use of children as 
soldiers, and serious crimes like the murder of community members. The Barza operated on 
the moral principle that all community members were ‘custodians’ of ancestral moral norms; 
accordingly, its rationale behind holding perpetrators accountable was to educate the 
community and to foster communal reconciliation through rituals performed to cleanse and 
rehabilitate wrongdoers and to restore dignity to victims (Kiyala, 2016:39). In light of this, the 
punishment imposed by the council of elders or notables was designed only for community 
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services and reparative penalties. For instance, cultivating a field for the community, building 
a hut in the chief’s courtyard, paying reparations (goats, mizaba (pearls), and so on), including 
the restriction of movement and banned from travelling out of his/her village for a certain 
period. However, penal sanctions such as imprisonment were never imposed (Kiyala, 2016:37-
38). The Barza thus became a local mechanism for holding ex-belligerents accountable and 
restoring them back into harmony with community values.  
Furthermore, the traditional mode of reintegration led by the Barza also worked effectively in 
the case of child soldiers, largely because of its sympathetic nature which included educating 
moral norms and providing advice, rather than prosecuting and humiliating. A 13-year-old 
former child soldier in Kahanga perceived the Barza as ‘a place where children get advice... 
Instead of incarceration, it is better that children make reparations for their offences to the 
community’ (Kilaya, 2016:42). For the prevention of the recruitment of child soldiers, the 
Barza took the following proactive measures: (1) dissuading armed group leaders from 
recruiting children and negotiating with them for the release of child soldiers; (2) meeting with 
parents whose children joined or intended to join armed forces, so as to find a way to 
demobilise and dissuade them; (3) announcing that traditional customs forbade children from 
engaging in armed fighting; and (4) advising youth not to engage in soldiering activities, in 
accordance with traditional customs (Kilaya, 2016:47).   
With regards to victims and their communities, their trust towards the perpetrators could be 
revived through the process of truth-telling. The truth-telling process not only empowered 
victims by bestowing them with the decision to forgive their perpetrators, but also enhanced 
their understanding of the nature and root causes of a conflict by sensitising perpetrators and 
crushing the general stigma towards them (Duthie, 2005:2). The restoration of trust in affected 
populations can be seen as a key for social reintegration since victims and community members 
in local justice processes perform as the gatekeepers of moral communities to which 





4.4.2 Truth-Seeking  
 
One of the most tragic events during the transition occurred in December 2004: the massacre 
in Nyabyondo, which took place in North Kivu during the transition period.  In mid-December, 
Mai-Mai troops- with the support from the central government - started fighting with RCD-
Goma forces in and around Nyabyondo. They attacked Hutu communities and killed civilians 
indiscriminately. Then, RCD-Goma troops retaliated by attacking the Mai-Mai stronghold at 
Nyabyondo; they systematically looted the villages, terrorised civilians, and raped women and 
girls. In this incident, at least 100 civilians were slaughtered, and many women and girls were 
raped by soldiers. 
However, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission failed to investigate the incident and could 
not produce any facts for the case. In the meantime, the MONUC launched an investigation 
into the atrocities and submitted its findings to the transitional government, as well as to Eugène 
Serufuli - the governor of the North Kivu province. Yet, the state handed down no charges to 
alleged perpetrators of the serious crimes (Kamwimbi, 2008:367). In this circumstance, the 
Barza entered a partnership with the Pole Institute, a local think tank in Goma, to conduct 
investigations into truth recovery in Nyabyondo - including other parts of the eastern region – 
before commencing its peace and justice processes (Tegera et al, 2004:10).  
4.4.3 Women and Child Empowerment 
 
The Barza also contributed greatly to the work of civil society in dealing with post-conflict 
effects on women and children. Considering that the violent conflict in the Kivus has been 
characterized by the high rates of sexual violence and the use of children soldiers, women and 
children were arguably the most vulnerable groups both during and after armed conflicts. The 
tremendous physical and psychological suffering amongst them rendered ‘justice’ a 
prerequisite for rebuilding a damaged social fabric, as well as for constructing sustainable 
peace. As the former president of SOCICO, a network of representatives of Congolese civil 
society, stated, ‘Unless the women and youth are heard, which are presently two large 
constituencies in the DRC that have been largely ignored in the past, the chances of lasting 
peace in the Congo are slim’(Villa-Vicencio, 2005:61). 
Although customary practices have widely been perceived as patriarchal, the work of the Barza 
contributed substantially to initiatives for the empowerment of women and children. In terms 
of structure, the Barza attempted to involve more women as members of the commission by 
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encouraging each ethnic group to send at least one woman as  a representative (Clark, 2008:7). 
This enhanced the Barza’s capacity to deal with sensitive issues such as sexual and domestic 
violence, as it could confront the issues in a sympathetic manner. Furthermore, the Barza 
arranged a platform for co-generative dialogue and local public hearings, in which victims - 
regardless of gender or age – could address their grievances and needs to their perpetrators 
directly. Perpetrators, including former child soldiers, could voice their problems and concerns, 
and, moreover, acknowledge their wrongdoings. Hence, the Barza helped to enable the voices 
of women and children to be heard, and assisted them to engage constructively in peace and 
justice processes.  
4.5 Conclusion 
 
At the beginning of transitional period, the Barza Inter-Communautaire - through its traditional 
approach to justice – induced a pacifying effect on armed conflict, and also cultivated fruitful 
grounds for justice and durable peace. The Barza’s positive contributions to conflict dynamics 
in the Kivus can be described in three ways, which will be elaborated on below.  
In terms of the proliferation of armed groups, the inclusive justice and peace processes led by 
the Barza not only advanced its capacity to address human rights violations by providing rebel 
groups a participatory platform for their voices to be heard by authorities, but also has a 
pacifying effect during the course of conflict. That is to say, the Barza’s  ethos of inclusivity 
assisted in preventing armed group from resorting to violence as a means of political leverage. 
Acknowledging the grievances and needs of rebel groups can diminish their motivation to use 
violence to acquire favourable agreements, which can lead to a higher likelihood of reaching a 
negotiated settlement and to a lower likelihood of conflict recurrence (Loyle & Appel, 2017).  
Secondly, the Barza adopted both reactive and proactive approaches in managing conflict2. On 
one hand, the Barza-led conflict resolution was aimed at reviving a sense of mutual trust among 
local populations through traditional practices of reconciliation. On the other hand, the Barza 
                                                 
2 According to Dinsmore, there are two primary approaches for managing conflict: reactive 
and proactive. ‘Reactive’ describes the approach that deals with a conflict after its outbreak, 
by using techniques such as negotiation and mediation. ‘Proactive’ describes an approach 





countered negative values by denouncing politicians who stirred up ethnic hatred for political 
gain (Clark, 2008:6). Moreover, the institution organised inter-ethnic activities and conducted 
research to appropriate the shared memory of violence and conflict in affected communities so 
as to forge new reconciled identities and (re)build harmony for community members (Tegera 
et al, 2004). The Barza was hence recognized by the central government and its international 
partners that the institution with its restorative potentials had spectacular successes in settling 
ethnic conflict and preventing armed mobilization along ethnic lines in the Kivu region.  
Lastly, the Barza was an effective complement to the state-led transition justice mechanisms; 
namely, the DDR programmes and  the TRC, including to other informal justice initiatives led 
by NGOs. Reconciling reintegration pursued by the Barza created possibilities of fostering 
justice and peace in the situations where the lines between perpetrators and victims were 
blurred. Through the principle of ‘Accountability through Acknowledgement’, the Barza was 
able to hold perpetrators accountable without (re)victimising them, while also acknowledging 
the need for redress for victims of past atrocities. The accountability measures of the Barza 
included the processes of truth-telling, community service and reparative penalties. Arguably, 
punishment without trails assisted in demobilising and dissuading combatants, especially child 
soldiers, from joining armed groups - encouraging them instead to return to civilian life. 
Furthermore, truth-seeking process conducted by the Barza significantly contributed to the 
justice processes in terms of accountability ensuring that human rights were upheld during the 
transitional period. Also, the Barza supported other informal justice initiatives led by NGOs, 
specifically women and child empowerment programmes. The institution included women and 
children – the two groups most susceptible to violence - in its justice and peace processes. With 
the Barza’s active supports, some justice and peace mechanisms could operate in the Kivus, 
notwithstanding that ongoing conflicts posed serious hindrances to the whole process of 








The Failures of the Barza Inter-Communautaire 
5.1 Introduction 
Despite of the Barza’s remarkable success in reducing rates of ethnic violence, armed conflicts 
in the Kivu provinces remained persistent stubbornly and maintained the overall atmosphere 
of terror of the wartime throughout the period of transition. The prolonged violent conflict in 
the aftermath of the Second Congo War invited questions of the effectiveness and impacts of 
the Barza on the Kivu societies. Arguably, the failures of the Barza in delivering justice and 
sustainable peace emanate from limited capacity and the problematic performance of the 
institution itself, as well as from innate impediments from a context of ongoing conflict. In this 
chapter, the Barza will be interrogated with theoretical and pragmatic questions so as to answer 
why it failed to find a sustainable resolution to violence and conflict, and, more significantly, 
how it strengthened the structure of violence and injustices that resulted in the continuity of 
violence after the transition.  
5.2 The Danger of ‘Excessive Localisation’ of Transitional Justice  
As mentioned before, the Barza was recognised by the Congolese government in 2003 as a 
national strategy for reconciliation, and garnered significance and relevance in many parts of 
the Kivu region. However, rather than providing access to justice for local civilians, the 
‘excessive localisation’ of transitional justice in the DRC gave rise to more injustices, largely 
because of the limited capacity of local justice mechanisms to hold the state accountable, and 
of its general inability to dismantle structures of violence and injustice.  
Throughout the transition from war to peace, justice initiatives led by the transitional 
government were hindered by a deteriorated state-society relationship that had resulted from a 
history of state-sponsored violence and from the state’s failure to protect its civilians from 
atrocities. In light of the growing autonomy of non-state actors, the Congolese state attempted 
to re-establish its rule and authority across the ungoverned Kivu provinces through both 
political and military strategies, in the hope of proceeding with political transition in the 
localities. The political competition between the state and local elites during the transition was 
intense, and evolved into armed fighting, generating a series of mass human rights violations, 
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massacres and population displacement. Accordingly, both state and non-state armed groups 
were perpetrators of mass atrocities and had to be held accountable.   
The Barza operated to resolve disputes between local ethnic communities. The institution put 
their huge efforts to deal with local political, economic and social agendas, all of which had 
caused widespread violence along ethnic lines, whereas they were either unable or unwilling 
to deal with national agendas of conflict in which the political and economic antagonisms 
between the state and local elites ran parallel to local conflicts and potentially reinforced local 
tensions. That is to say, the Barza’s principles and practices were geared towards interpersonal 
and interethnic reconciliation, aiming to ameliorate the acrimonious relationships between 
local populations who were either victims, perpetrators or beneficiaries of ethnic violence 
(Seils, 2017:5). In this sense, the Barza conceived violent conflict in the Kivus as individual 
and communal affairs, which could be resolved adequately through the process of mediation 
and negotiation. By this means, the Barza arguably produced three major adversities: (1) the 
disregard of structural violence; (2)the absence of state actors and the presence of predatory 
non-state actors in local justice processes, and (3) the deteriorated relations between the state 
and its citizens.  
Firstly, the conflicts in the Kivus had increasingly become self-sustaining and autonomous in 
nature (Autesserre, 2006). However, horizontalising mass atrocities in the localities, by 
classifying them simply as ‘local affairs’, distorts the fact that armed conflict in the Kivus was 
a result of political competition between various local, national and international elites. In other 
words, conflict in the Kivus was not simply a matter of disputes between various ethnic groups, 
but also between the state, its neighbouring countries - especially Rwanda - and its civilians. 
Thus, overstating individual and communal levels of ethnic conflict obscures the structure of 
violence. The existence of structural violence and injustices not only sustains antagonistic 
sentiments among parties, which is a hindrance to developing a mutual sense of commitment 
to shared norms and values, but also fundamentally undermines the legitimacy of transitional 
justice mechanisms (Murphy, 2015:64). In case of the Barza, the history of ethnic divisions 
inherently split the commission’s members, which were comprised of different ethnic 
representatives, into two groups along ethnic lines: the Banyarwanda and non-Banyarwanda. 
Several human rights observers accused Barza leaders as of ‘blatant hypocrisy’, as the leaders 
professed to be nurturing harmony among ethnic communities and would denounce others’ 
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manipulation of ethnicity, while they were an ethnically divided ‘cohort’ themselves (Clark, 
2008:9).  
Secondly, the Barza’s exclusive focus on local violent actors (local militias) in its justice 
processes resulted in the absence of state actors as belligerents and enablers of mass atrocities, 
leading to the question of state accountability for their serious crimes. This created not only a 
gap of impunity between state and non-state violent actors, but also a reservoir of unprocessed 
resentment on the part of victims of state-sponsored violence. More importantly, despite the 
fact that effective justice and peace mechanisms were inclusive and participatory, the inclusion 
of armed groups - regardless of their predatory and abusive practices towards civilians - was 
likely to be destructive. The recognition of armed groups as political actors rather than criminal 
actors, by negotiating and agreeing to their political demands for the sake of their 
demobilization, implicitly rewards violent actors and entrenches impunity. In this sense, the 
Barza winded up turning justice into a negotiable commodity, and this form of justice provision 
created an impediment to the successful transition to a just and peaceful society. Arguably, to 
forge more effective inclusion in transitional justice and peace processes, the major 
considerations should be more about exclusion matters; in other words, setting a limit on 
inclusion needed to be considered. For instance, who is to be included, why are they included, 
and in what processes should they be included?. In this view, armed actors should perhaps be 
excluded from decision-making processes, and non-violent actors be recognised as legitimate 
actors instead. Consequently, justice and peace initiatives may be deflected from political 
agendas that serve armed group’s interests.  
Thirdly, in ungoverned areas, local justice mechanisms which attach too much weight to 
creating bonding social capital among local communities are inclined to damage bridging 
social capital between the state and local civilians. Given the history of a deteriorating 
relationship  between the state and its civilians in the Kivus, the Barza’s attempt to rebuild 
relationships between local communities – through the rekindling of shared memories of 
violence among affected communities - may have invigorated antagonistic sentiments between 
the state and local populations. Furthermore, the prevalence of anti-government sentiments 
could provide fertile grounds for the creation of rebel groups, and the subsequent mobilisation 
of civilians to support them. Hence, through the lens of social capital, the presence of 
crosscutting ties - that cut across social groups and between social groups and the government 
- is essential for preventing the recurrence of both horizontal and vertical hostilities.  
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5.3 The Pitfalls of Reconciliation   
In the realm of transitional politics, reconciliation always casts social conflict in the service of 
the unity of political community (Schaap, 2008:249). Apart from positive accounts of 
reconciliation for post-conflict societies, its political objective also underwrites coercive 
aspects of reconciliation which can undermine a sense of ownership and restrict the meaningful 
participation of victims.  
5.3.1 Reconciliation as Resignation 
Reconciliation as a means of post-conflict nation-building has long been criticized on the 
ground that it places a burden of dealing with past atrocities on the side of victims by 
demanding them to forgive and forget their perpetrators when they have rights to resent and 
resist (Schaap, 2008:257). With its ‘resignation’ feature, reconciliation appears to revictimise 
those who have suffered from past violence and to privilege the acquiescence to the injustices 
in which the affected society originated so as to make the establishment of a new political 
association possible (Schaap, 2008:258).  
In case of the Barza, reconciliation lied at the heart of its operation. The institution leaned more 
towards achieving communal unity and stability than to administering ‘justice’. The 
community leaders or elders, who were the judicial elites, were neither independent nor 
impartial, since their discretion was always applied for the betterment of community harmony 
and peace, and not for the sake of justice demanded by individuals. By extolling the virtue of 
forgiveness, the Barza did not promote victims’ right not to reconcile, but instead encouraged 
them to forgive unconditionally for the sake of re-building the community. In this manner, the 
local justice process led by the Barza not only revictimized but also reproduced conditions of 
oppression that enveloped the lives of victims. Encouraging forgiveness, rather than restoring 
agency to victims, deprives them from agency as it denies their right and willingness to not 
reconcile with perpetrators. In addition, inauthentic forgiveness can create further resistance to 
reconciliation; the ‘peaceful coexistence’ of conflicting individuals and groups does not 
necessarily mean that antagonistic relationships among them have been resolved, as 
antagonistic parties can live more or less separately without bearing a mutual respect for one 
another (Seils, 2017:6, Bloomfield, 2006:13-16). In the wake of such fragile degrees of trust, 
conflict can recur whenever individuals or ethnic groups feel threated.  
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Accordingly, in the process of post-conflict reconciliation, there is always the risk that 
oppression becomes legitimised for the sake of building a utopian community. Forced 
forgiveness and cheap reconciliation can have adverse impacts on post-conflict societies, 
largely because they are detrimental to victims’ human dignity as their (justified) feelings of 
resentment get dismissed.  
Arguably, rather than abandoning resentment and replacing it with false forgiveness, the 
presence of resentment during the process of reconciliation can be regarded as a contributor to 
genuine reconciliation. That is to say, genuine reconciliation should begin with the 
consummation of resentment, meaning the perpetrator’s acknowledgment and acceptance of 
his or her past wrongdoing, as well as an acknowledgment of the adverse consequences that it 
had on others (Nadler, 2012:304). This, in turn, is more likely to usher in genuine forgiveness 
and reconciliation. In this sense, the apparent absence of victim resentment cannot be assumed 
to be an indication of reconciliation. Hence, the difference between false and genuine 
reconciliation lies in the manner in which victims’ feelings of resentment are confronted and 
managed within the process of reconciliation.   
5.3.2 The Problem of State-Sponsored Informalism  
Reconciliation can also be seen as an ideological instrument that invokes the common good to 
legitimate a particular order in which the privileged attain their own interests over ‘have-nots’ 
(Loyle & Davenport, 2015). In 2003, the transitional government agreed to employ the model 
of the Barza in support of social-cultural measures used to pacify social tensions across the 
DRC (Villa-Vicencio et al., 2005: 58). After its success in North Kivu, Arthur Z’Ahidi Ngoma, 
a former RCD leader who was one of four vice presidents of transitional government, attempted 
to introduce the Barza to South Kivu in 2005. The Kinshasa-led initiative for establishing the 
Barza caused popular demonstrations in March 2005; demonstrators waved placards bearing 
messages that read ‘Barza=Conflict’ (Clark, 2008:8). Opponents to the Barza claimed that the 
Barza was another form of political imposition and control from Kinshasa; the interethnic 
members of the Barza were not representative of the affected groups, but were government 
lackeys who worked for the good of state interests. One of the local NGO workers in South 
Kivu remarked the following; 
‘It wasn’t considered a priority in a period of major insecurity. There were massacres 
at Wilungu. FDLR [Forces De ́mocratiques pour la Libe ́ration du Rwanda] brutality 
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was continuing. The government couldn’t pay teachers but now was trying to tell us 
how to calm [inter-ethnic] tensions. And we couldn’t recognise these so-called 
community elders they wanted to install in the Barza. They weren’t our leaders…’ 
(Clark, 2008:8) 
Evidently, the Barza was perceived by locals as a means for political elites in Kinshasa to 
pacify resentment and resistance on the ground by wielding the traditional practices of 
reconciliation for their own gain. The state attempts to impose central rules through the 
cooperation with local elites can result not only in the forfeiting popular legitimacy of local 
leaders and the collapse of local institutions, but also in a soured relationship between the 
central government and its local civilians. Another human rights worker in Bukavu said the 
following; 
‘It is telling that the Vice- President hasn’t returned to South Kivu since the Barza 
project collapsed […] it is an admission of a huge failure. The people of South Kivu 
sent a clear message to Kinshasa that they will not accept any form of political 
interference in their affairs’ (Clark, 2008:9).  
In sum, a lack genuine reconciliation could become a major hindrance to the establishment of 
just and long-term peaceful society as victims may still harbour feelings of resentment, sowing 
a seed for the future outbreak of conflict. On the one hand, traditional practices of 
reconciliation, with their aspirations of rebuilding the community, tend to disregard victim’s 
right not to reconcile; the individual demand of justice is denied for the sake of community 
harmony. On the other hand, tradition practices of reconciliation can be exploited by the state 
to pacify and silence resentment from the affected populations in order to overcome the state’s 





5.4 Justice Processes during Armed Conflict 
According to Loyle and Binningsbø’s cross-national dataset, 2,205 justice processes 
implemented during 204 internal armed conflicts between 1946 and 2011 demonstrate that 
during-conflict justice processes have a decreasing effect on conflict intensity, and an 
increasing effect on the likelihood of a negotiated settlement (Loyle&Binningsbø, 2018). 
However, experiences in the Kivu provinces show the tendency that transitional justice 
processes appear to be associated with less beneficial conflict development; and moreover, 
perhaps have a negative effect on conflict intensity and termination.  
In the moments of ongoing conflict in the Kivus, the Barza was embodied in the constellation 
of power shaped by local, national and international political dynamics. Rather than influencing 
conflict trajectory, the collapse of the Barza in late 2005 are indicative how its existence and 
operation were conditioned and circumscribed by conflict dynamics and boarder political 
developments. As a community-led institution, the Barza hardly withstood the massive flow 
of political tensions and contestations in the locality during the run-up to the national election. 
The institution became an alternative platform for domestic elites to gain and consolidate their 
political power against oppositions. Thus, the following section of this thesis will analyse how 
conflict development during the 2003-06 transition affected the Barza’s operations, 
culminating its breakdown in 2005.  
5.4.1 The Invention of the ‘Rwandaphonie’ Ideology 
At the very beginning of the transition, the disagreement within the transitional government 
over power-sharing led to fragmentation within the national army and its administration; many 
RCD-G representatives decided to create alliances to oppose the Kabila-led transitional 
government. At the time, the RCD-G gained political and military control over many parts of 
North Kivu and purposed to expand its influence over the Kivus region in order to achieve a 
grassroots base for the upcoming general election (International Crisis Group, 2005:11). 
Consequently, the government began to support the Mai-Mai - the community-led militia in 
the eastern region - to fight against the RCD-G militia, who was sponsored by Rwanda.  
Accordingly, during the transition period, the conflict development in the Kivus arguably was 
on an upward trajectory, driven by the dissension between Kabila and RCD-G, as well as by 
the growing political tensions and uncertainty during the pre-election period. Conflicting 
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parties appeared to be enthusiastic about using the ‘ethnic card’ as an integral part of their 
campaigning strategies, even if it meant fostering communal conflict in their localities. The 
ethnic disputes between the Banyarwanda and non-Banyarwanda reached a climax in late 2004, 
largely due to the invention of ‘Rwandaphonie’ by Governor Serufuli, claiming that the very 
survival of Banyarwanda was at stake and that the harmony between Hutu and Tutsi 
communities was needed as a shield against the oppressors (International Crisis Group, 
2005:8).  
The emergence the ‘Rwandaphonie’ ideology triggered a series of identity-focused discourses 
underpinned by the specific history of marginalisation and oppression against Banyarwanda. 
Such ethnic discourses were an effective tool for political elites to mobilise the grassroots for 
particular ends, as well as to justify fighting against their opponents. For example, in early 
2004, Francois Gachaba and Felicien Nzitatira, leaders of the Hutu and Tutsi communities 
respectively, published the ‘Memrandum of Congolese Rwandaphone’ in the local newspaper 
Le Soft, describing the systematic persecution and stereotyping of Congolese Hutu and Tutsi 
by the post-independence government. They urged the transitional government to keep this 
history in mind when debating the draft constitution and the law on citizenship (International 
Crisis Group, 2005:11). Through emphasising the traumatic past, the publication generated a 
collective identity among Congolese Hutu and Tutsi as the marginalised and oppressed 
populations, paving the way for RCD-G political elites to mobilise the Banyarwanda against 
the transitional government. Then, in March 2004, armed men forced a private radio station in 
Bukavu to broadcast a series of messages stating that the Catholic Church and other 
organisations were preparing a genocide against the ‘Banyamulenge’ - the Tutsi in the South 
Kivu province. Consequently, in June 2004, Laurent Nkunda marched on Bukavu, claiming 
that General Mbuza Mabe - the Congolese army commander in South Kivu - was perpetrating 
a genocide against the Banyamulenge (International Crisis Group, 2005:11). However, there 
was no evidence that a genocide had been taking place, and the siege of Bukavu led to the 
deterioration of human security as mass human rights violations were perpetrated by Nkunda’s 
armed troops (Stearns, 2012:37).  
In the meantime, anti-Tutsi sentiment was evident and widespread both in Kinshasa and in the 
Kivu provinces. For instance, when a group of several hundred of refugees who had fled 
Bukavu after armed fighting in May and June 2004 attempted to return to the city, they were 
met by an anti-Tutsi rally that was organised and supported by local political elites. Some of 
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the Tutsi refugees were subjected to arrest and harassment by the army (International Crisis 
Group, 2005:12-13). As a result, the notion of the ‘Rwandaphonie’ was embraced by the 
Congolese Tutsi as it could protect them from the former Rwandan army (ex-FAR), the former 
Rwandan Hutu militias (Interahamwe), and the so-called ‘autochthonous’ Congolese groups. 
Majune, a Hutu secretary of the Barza, remarked;  
‘Hutu and Tutsi have not been listening to the Barza […] Rwandaphonie has come to 
mean something to them. It is only a political dynamic, not the reality, but the Barza 
has found it difficult to get that message across to the people’ (Clark, 2008:10).  
5.4.2 The Malfunctions of the Barza: Mirrors of Ethnic Division 
The emergence of Rwandaphonie ideology not only exacerbated the ethnic divisions between 
Banyarwanda and non-Banyarwanda in the Kivus, but also in the Barza. Non-Banyarwanda 
members of the Barza accused their Banyarwanda colleagues of facilitating the fostering of the 
‘Rwandaphonie’ ideology, and of supporting Hutu and Tutsi movements in their mobilisation 
against other ethnic groups. The ‘Rwandophonie’ ideology naturally gained credence among 
Hutu and especially Tutsi groups because it afforded them a sense of security in the face of 
growing antagonism from the ‘autochthonous’ ethnic groups. Although Banyarwanda 
members insisted that the emerging ‘Rwandophonie’ ideology was not reflective of the reality 
of life in the Hutu and Tutsi communities, the growing solidarity between Hutu and Tutsi 
around the ideology generated a climate of distrust among non-Banyarwanda leaders. Alexis 
Kalinda, a Nyanga representative in the Barza, expressed his worry;  
‘The manipulators came to the Barza to explain to us what ‘Rwandaphonie’ meant. 
They said, ‘We need a communal sense of language and identity to protect ourselves.’ 
[…]This is what scares many groups in North Kivu. The Rwandans have an army, 
which makes them dangerous…There are extremists like those who killed [Rwandan 
President] Habyarimana in 1994 operating here now. All ethnic groups live together 
and the Barza reflects that, but non-Banyarwanda are very fearful’ (Clark, 2008:10). 
Furthermore, non-Banyarwanda members of the Barza also accused Hutu and Tutsi leaders of 
being aware of the mass import and distribution of weapons among Hutu and not attempting 
to stop it. Many non-Banyarwanda leaders interpreted the distribution of arms as the ultimate 
manifestation of Rwandaphonie, and suggested that Hutu and Tutsi leaders should intervene 
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directly to halt to spread of weapons, as the weapons could potentially be used against non-
Banyarwanda civilians (Clark, 2008:10). However, the prevention of mass distribution of arms 
across the Rwandan-Congolese border and amongst Hutu was beyond the Banyarwanda 
community leaders’ capabilities, as Governor Serufuli - the instigator of the incident – had 
seized control of the North Kivu province’s political and military resources. Serufuli was 
known as ‘l’homme incontournable’ (literally ‘the indispensable man’) of Goma, and was the 
nexus of military and economic power in the eastern region (International Crisis Group, 
2005:10).  
With the support of Rwandan authorities, Serufuli established a local NGO, ‘Tous pour la Paix 
et le Développement’ (TPD), that operated parallel to his official military and administrative 
bodies. The TPD played an important role in providing assistance to the RCD-G by supplying 
trucks for the transportation of troops and arms. Evidently, the TPD was aligned with Nkunda’s 
troops in his siege of Bukavu (Wolter, 2004:3) through its transportation of weapons for 
distribution to Banyarwanda populatiosn in Masisi and Rutshuru, North Kivu in early 2005 
(UN Security Council, 2018). Moreover, Serufuli’s grip on power and his ‘Rwandaphonie’ 
ideology were backed by his colleagues in local government and business; these colleagues 
included Léon Muheto, the director of the state electricity company Société Nationale 
d'Electricité (SNEL) in Goma, and Modeste Makabuza - the most powerful businessman in 
Goma - who controlled much of the fuel brought into Goma, owned the Société Congolaise 
d'Assurances et de Rassurances (SCAR) insurance company, held shares in the Supercell 
phone company, and owned a niobium mine in Rutshuru. Moreover, the Rwandan government 
was also an integral part of this alliance.  
Under the light of powerful alliance among political and economic elites, it is impossible for 
communal leaders to intervene this robust interest-based network. The unrealistic expectation 
from non-Banyarwanda towards Bayanrwanda members creates a pool of resentment within 
the Barza itself, which significantly undermines the enabling environment for parties to have 
a dialogue and maintain their cooperation. Hence, the distrust among the Barza’s members, as 
a result of the spread of the ‘Rwandaphonie’ ideology and of weapons among Banyarwanda, 
is instrumental in the malfunction and collapse of the Barza. That is to say, rather than a 
mechanism for conflict resolution, the Barza performs as a mirror of ethnic divisions in the 
Kivu provinces; it reflects the root cause of conflict accurately but cannot resolve it.  
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5.5 Conclusion  
 
There are three explanations for the perceived failure of the Barza to deliver justice and durable 
peace: the excessive localisation of transitional justice, the pitfalls of reconciliation, and the 
state of ongoing armed conflict throughout the transition period. The pitfalls and failures of the 
Barza not only negated the success of the institution in the nascent stages of the transitional 
period, but also partially contributed to the phenomenon of armed group proliferation in the 
post-transition Kivus.  
In terms of the excessive localisation of transitional justice, transitional justice in the Kivus 
relied too heavily on the local justice mechanism in conflict-affected areas appears to have an 
increasing effect on conflict intensity. Firstly, the failure of the state-led transitional justice 
mechanisms and the implementation of the Barza’s reconciliatory approach as the national 
strategy to decrease social tension in the Kivus may signal a weak government and thus 
motivates both rebel groups and political and military elites to use violence to reach their goals 
(Davies, 2014). Evidently, since the 2003-06 political transition, the use of violence by 
politicians and military officers has become a means of bargaining political power with the 
central government. (Stearns, 2014:169). Secondly, the excessive reliance on local justice 
mechanisms is likely to produce more injustices which can be a source of future conflicts. The 
Barza’s exclusive focus on local political, economic, social agendas that contribute to the 
outbreak of violent conflict horizontalises mass human rights violation in the Kivus which is 
also systematic and vertical by its nature. Consequently, the state actors, as belligerents and 
enablers of mass atrocities, appear to be absent from the Barza’s justice processes, resulting in 
the gap of impunity between state and non-state actors as well as a reservoir of unprocessed 
resentment on the part of victims of state-sponsored violence. Thirdly, the Barza’s ultimate 
goal as interethnic reconciliation possibly generates undesirable outcomes in ungoverned areas 
to the extent that the imbalance in creating bonding social capital (ties across social groups) 
and bridging social capital  (ties between the government and social groups) in the locality may 
lead to the endurance of antagonistic sentiments between the central state and its civilians. The 
existing deep-seated distrust towards the state among local populations may raise a sense of 
reliance on armed groups as a legitimate provider of protection and security which further fuels 
the proliferation of small armed groups in the Kivus. 
The pitfalls of reconciliation are two-dimensional. With regards to the political objective of 
reconciliation in post-conflict society, the Barza’s justice and peace mechanisms accentuated 
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on coercive aspects of reconciliation. To that extent, the institution espoused the notion that 
victims had a moral obligation to forgive their perpetrators for the sake of uniting their 
communities. In this manner, the Barza-led reconciliation not only revictimised, but also 
reproduced conditions of subjugation and oppression, by privileging the acquiescence of 
victims to forgive over their enthusiastic consent for the sake of establishing a new political 
community. As a consequence, the unprocessed resentment among victims formed the 
breeding ground for rebel groups to mobilise local populations against their oppressors [either 
the government or other armed groups]. This created an increased likelihood of armed 
confrontation in the post-conflict period. In another aspect, the Barza, as the state-sponsored 
local justice mechanisms, was perceived by local civilians as a tool of pacifying and silencing 
resentment and resistance used by political elites in Kinshasa in order to overcome the state’s 
crisis of legitimacy in the Kivus, as well as to consolidate the Kabila regime. The widespread 
discontent with the central government and its social and political order reinforced popular 
support for armed groups to exercise their authority as a state in both military and non-military 
domains, which resulted in the ubiquitous militarisation of the Kivus.  
Finally, the ongoing armed conflict amidst a transitional context presents challenges for 
transitional justice processes. The Kivus were in the process of political transition when armed 
conflict was still raging in the provinces. In this period of unsettlement, the advent of political 
transition introduced what had been termed a ‘formalised political unsettlement’, referring to 
a political settlement that manages and contains a conflict rather than resolves it, by translating 
it into new political and legal institutions that enable the continuing process of negotiation 
between competing ethno-political groups (Bell&Pospisil, 2017: 8-10). In other words, a set of 
transitional justice institutions becomes another theatre for ongoing conflict providing 
belligerents with space and time to negotiate and consolidate their political power, which 
culminates in the persistence of ‘unsettledness’ in the post-transitional period. Apart from the 
use of violence, both the government and the RCD-G competed to control the Barza so as to 
project power and exert influence in the locality rather than resolve conflict through this 
contingent mechanism. The Barza was perceived by Kivutians as a means for the RCD-G to 
establish sympathetic leadership at the grassroots level during the political transition, so as to 
create a voter base for the general elections in 2006, whereas the Kabila-led government 
claimed the Barza to be part of its national strategy to build peace and consolidate state power 
in the Kivus. The competition between these two major armed actors generated smaller rebel 




6.1 Introduction  
The continuity of armed conflict and the proliferation of small armed groups in the post-
transitional Kivu provinces raises questions about the effectiveness and impacts of the Barza-
led justice mechanism on ungoverned localities. Chapter 6 will attempt to answer these 
questions by presenting the contributions and failures of the Barza during the period of political 
transition (2003-2006) when violence and conflict continued to rage the Kivu provinces.  
The Barza - with its restorative potentials - not only functioned as a transitional justice 
mechanism focusing on redressing legacies of mass human rights abuses, but its works also 
related to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Throughout the years 1998 to 2004 - which 
were years of tremendous political turmoil and armed conflict in the many parts of the eastern 
DRC – the Barza was recognized as an effective mechanism for resolving and preventing 
ethnic violence which contributed to the increased stability in the Kivus (European Union: 
2001; Bourque & Sampson, 2001:33).  
However, the achievements of the Barza were varied and short-lived. Owing to local 
particularities, it was successful only in the North Kivu province and not in the South Kivu 
province (Clark, 2008). Arguably, there are two main explanations as to why South Kivutians 
did not embrace the Barza. Firstly, the model of the Barza in South Kivu was state-imposed. 
This differed from North Kivu, where the system of traditional community court - known as 
the ‘baraza’ - had already been in the locality for generations (Villa-Vicencio et al., 2005:58). 
South Kivutians perceived the Barza as an attempt of political elites in Kinshasa to expand the 
state’s control over the South Kivu province (Clark, 2008:8-9). The second explanation for the 
South Kivutians’ rejection of the Barza is rooted in the relationship between the Barza and the 
RCD leadership - the latter representing the interests of the Banyarwandan people. Due to the 
constant presence of anti-Tutsi sentiments in South Kivu, non-Tutsi populations had been 
fighting against any form of rule by the Banyamulenge, who were perceived by the non-Tutsi 
as the owners of a disproportionate share of land and other resources.  
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Furthermore, in 2005, the quality of  Barza’s operations in North Kivu progressively worsened 
owing to regional and national political dynamics, which were linked to the ethnic animosity 
during the pre-national election. The escalation of ethnic hostilities in the Kivus stemmed 
largely from the emergence of the ‘Rwandaphonie’ ideology that was embraced by non-
Banyarwanda populations. The ongoing conflict and its complexity imposed both 
methodological and political constraints for the Barza in its pursuit of justice and peace. 
Eventually, the Barza collapsed altogether by the end of 2005. Since the 2006 national election, 
tensions and conflict in the Kivus have gradually intensified (Human Rights Watch, 2009)  
largely because of the rise of the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) and the 
proliferation of small armed groups.  
The rise and fall of the Barza not only demonstrate the structural elements of violence and 
conflict in the DRC - namely, the problem of weak state and the manipulation of ethnicity - but 
also highlights the politics of transition. Both the transitional government and insurgents 
resorted to a wide range of non-violent strategies, as well as military operations, which 
escalated the conflict and resulted in their own respective favourable outcomes. Accordingly, 
the use of local justice mechanisms during ongoing conflict in the Kivus can be perceived as a 
part of a political strategy that ended up having both positive and negative implications for 
conflict dynamics.  
6.2 The Contributions of the Barza Inter-Communautaire 
In the prevailing conditions of instability and violence, limited steps had been taken towards 
achieving a reasonable degree of accountability, acknowledgement and reconciliation. To an 
extent, the Barza-led justice and peace processes had pacifying effects on armed conflict and 
were tools for conflict resolution and the de-escalation of violence.  
Firstly, given conflict in the Kivus involving a range of non-state armed groups that have 
different motivations for their operations, the inclusion of non-state armed groups in the justice 
processes could advance the effectiveness of the mechanism to address systematic human 
rights violations, hold belligerents accountable, and, moreover, prevent the recurrence of 
violent conflict. Acknowledging grievances and the needs of rebel groups can diminish their 
motivation to use violence to acquire favourable agreements for themselves, leading to an 
increased possibility of negotiated settlements and a decreased likelihood of conflict 
recurrence.  
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Secondly, dialogue was an integral part of the justice process and conflict resolution led by the 
Barza. Participating in dialogue was a means of empowering to the extent that victims can 
voice their grievances and needs directly to perpetrators, and to the public at large, while 
perpetrators could acknowledge responsibility their crimes.  In this sense, dialogue was a 
platform that restored agency to the victims since it rendered a sense of recognition to affected 
people. Furthermore, through the processes of apology and forgiveness, when perpetrators 
apologise and seek forgiveness from victims, they give the formerly powerless victim the 
power to grant forgiveness, and moreover, the status of gatekeepers of the moral communities 
to which perpetrators belong. This practice can be empowering and equalizing experiences for 
victims. In this way, processed resentment on the part of victims and affected communities not 
only has the potential to settle conflict but can also deter the future mobilisation of 
civilian populations.  
Thirdly, distrust, as a result of the years of warfare and instability, persisted stubbornly and 
continued to degrade relationships between the Kivutians. The absence of trust is regarded as 
damaging to relationships and making an entire society more vulnerable to violent conflict. 
Accordingly, the revival of trust becomes instrumental in transitional justice processes in the 
sense that trust can bolster and stabilise the normative expectations constitutive of moral 
relationships in transitional societies.In this light, the Barza underscores relational and identity-
based perspectives of reconciliation, in which the instrumental value of trust is explored and 
nurtured. The presence of trust is considered an essential condition for reconciliation, conflict 
prevention and other positive changes to be made possible.  
Lastly, the Barza’s principle of ‘Accountability through Acknowledgement’ invites 
possibilities for attaining perceived justice in the complex conflict situations. The institution 
holds former soldiers accountable and also recognises and redresses victim’s sufferings 
through the traditional processes of truth-telling and public hearings. In addition, retributive 
measures were also adopted by the Barza in the forms of community services and reparative 
penalties, aimed at restoring social harmony and order. Arguably, punishment without trail, as 
the traditional mode of reconciliation and reintegration, contributed significantly to 
reintegration; it helps to demobilise and dissuade combatants, especially child soldiers, from 
joining armed group and encouraged them return to civilian life. In this sense, the Barza-led 
justice process can be closely linked to peace building efforts, since it benefited the process of 
demilitarisation in the Kivu provinces.  
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6.3 The Failures of the Barza Inter-Communautaire 
As mentioned in the chapter 5, the failures of the Barza to deliver justice and transform conflict 
dynamics can be explained by three reasons: the excessive localisation of transitional justice, 
the pitfalls of reconciliation, and the state of ongoing armed conflict in the transitional context.  
These three matters reflect limitations and fallacies of the Barza as a local justice mechanism 
itself, as well as challenges associated with responding to serious and massive human rights 
violations in the midst of ongoing armed conflict. In the context of an ungoverned space 
characterised by the presence of multiple regulatory authorities and the prevalence of violence, 
the Barza was embedded in the middle of provincial, national and international powers, and 
thus straightforwardly became a political instrument for warring parties in the course of 
conflict. Arguably, rather than establishing justice and durable peace, the Barza mechanism 
produced conflict settlement; it strengthened existing structures of injustices capable of 
consolidating the political unsettlement and the (re)production of violence in the Kivu 
provinces. The following section will articulate how during-conflict justice processes have an 
increasing effect on conflict intensity, leading to the continuity of conflict in the Kivus.  
The pursuit of attitudinal and interpersonal reconciliation is problematic when a conflict 
involves widespread and systematic attack against civilian populations. The disregard of 
structural dimensions of reconciliation implicitly denies the fact that a significant source of 
distrust and a negative perception of ‘the other’ is the erosion of the rule of law. The existence 
of structural violence in which institutions and systems perpetuate inequality and injustices is 
the key argument as to why conflict becomes intractable. In this sense, the advancement of the 
virtue of forgiveness among victims is destructive to the extent that it places the burden of 
dealing with atrocities on the side of victims and creates a culture of impunity for wrongdoers.  
In the case of the Kivus, positing forgiveness as a moral obligation of victims absolved 
government officials and soldiers from accountability for their crimes. Hence, the Barza, as the 
state-sponsored local justice mechanism, functioned as a tool to pacify and silence civilian the 
dissatisfaction with the central government and the current social-political order. Rather than 
establishing justice, the Barza inadvertently assisted the central government in overcoming its 




Furthermore, by recognising the Barza as a part of a national strategy for political transition, 
the central government may have exposed its weaknesses and its willingness to negotiate. The 
state-sponsored Barza can be seen as a tool of negotiation and balancing power in the 
ungoverned Kivus where rebel strength far outweighs the government. Rather than settling 
conflict, the Barza, with its peace-based approach to justice, managed conflict through 
interethnic dialogue. The institution enabled the continuing process of negotiation between 
competing ethno-political groups by providing them space and time to negotiate. Ongoing 
negotiations without any meaningful agreements is detrimental and toxic, since it does not 
resolve issues, but rather exacerbates conflict intensity. As Swart argues, each new incident of 
violence emerging from a violation of a ‘peace’ agreement would exacerbate the existing 
conflict by adding new conditions of conflict potential (Swart, 2011:144). Moreover, the signal 
of weak state may also inspire non-state armed groups to use a violent means to achieve their 
ends once the negotiation does not produce favourable outcomes for them. Arguably, the 
establishment of the Barza reflects consensus among conflicting parties to continue to work 
out disagreement through a set of temporary and contingent institutions, rather than through 
outright violence (Bell&Pospisil, 2017:9). In other words, they create the institution that 
contains ‘agreement to disagree’ and provides a space for (re)negotiation, which culminates in 
the persistence of political unsettledness in the post-transitional period.  
The general circumstances in the Kivu provinces after the transition can be described as ‘stable 
instability’; the region was plagued by violent conflict, and nothing was significantly different 
from the wartime period. In fact, the circumstances in the post-transitional period may have 
been worse than before. The proliferation of armed groups was the most striking phenomenon 
in the Kivus. In 2008, there were approximately twenty armed groups. In 2015, at least seventy 
armed groups were active in the eastern DRC, primarily in the Kivu provinces (Stearns & 
Vogel, 2015:5).  
After the transition, the conflict was heavily concentrated in the ‘Petit Nord’ area - located in 
the southern part of North Kivu province. The ‘Petit Nord’ area includes Goma and the 
territories of Nyragongo, Walikale, Masisi and Rutshuru. The four major armed groups, who 
were all involved in an armed battle causing serious human rights violations in the early period 
after the transition, were the former warring parties: National Congress for the Defence of the 
People (CNDP), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR),  the Mai-Mai 
coalition of PARECO, and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(FARDC) (Spittaels & Hilgert, 2008).  In general, the FDLR, the Mai-Mai groups and the 
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FARDC tended to cooperate in the battle against the CNDP, which was probably the most 
powerful rebel movement in the post-transition era (Spittaels & Hilgert, 2008:3). The CNDP -
a Tutsi-led dissident faction of the RCD-G that was backed by the Rwandan government -
positioned itself as a politico-military movement, with the aim of protecting the interests 
(particularly those concerning grazing lands) of Congolese Tutsi population. However, the 
CNDP militia has been infamous for committing serious crimes against civilians, including 
Tutsi people, and its use of child soldiers. The back-and-forth fighting between the CNDP and 
three armies created security issues that led to large scale human displacement and other human 
suffering. Additionally, the prevalence of violence and conflict triggered the mobilisation of 
other armed groups in the region, either allied with or against the Nkunda-led militia. Several 
armed groups in the Kivus in 2008 cited the security threat imposed by the CNDP as the main 
reason for their mobilisation (Stearns, 2014:166). The rapid increase in the number of self-
defence groups in many parts of the Kivus can be interpreted as a grassroots response to 
growing instability and violence. The demand for protection at a grassroots community level 
provides fertile grounds for rural militias to mobilise local populations and to function as 
legitimate providers of protection and security.  
As a consequence, collaboration with armed groups became normalised in the logic of 
comparative advantage; those who lacked ‘protection’ from armed actors were at an enormous 
disadvantage in violent and volatile political spaces. This disadvantage necessitated civilians’ 
need to collaborate with armed groups - not only because of a need for protection, but also to 
fulfil their own personal objectives. However, there were several civilian resistance against 
armed personnel occurring in the Kivus, which were influenced by estimations of how 
dangerous or useful a certain soldier, officer, or military unit would be in the future (Verweijen, 
2018:292). Everyday micro-resistance, such as bargaining with armed agents, was probably 
the most common social practice in the localities, but its personalized, unorganized, and 
incoherent acts had not enough potentials to undermine the armed actors’ domination 
(Verweijen, 2018).  
Furthermore, civilian dissatisfaction with the central government and the social-political order 
reinforced popular support for armed groups to engage in social activities in the Kivus. The 
growing role of armed groups in non-military domains of social life led to an increased climate 
of militarisation. In several cases, the ambitions of local militia leaderships went further than 
safeguarding community members and protecting the interests of ethnic groups. Armed groups 
struggled over the authority to rule territory and grassroots populations including to use local 
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resources by increasing their presence in non-military domains, particularly in local justice 
processes and taxation mechanisms (Vlassenroot, et al., 2016:42).   
In sum, the unresolved conflict and widespread violence in the post-transitional Kivus led to 
the increasing civilian demand for protection, the normalization of civilian collaboration with 
armed groups, and the civilian discontent with the central government and the current social-
political order.  These factors raised the significance of armed groups in both military and non-
military domains. Armed groups became a central feature of political settlement in the Kivus 
and played a critical role in non-military aspects of social life. As a consequence, the very 
presence of armed groups contributed to a climate of insecurity in the region, since their 
existence was based on the public’s perception that they defended specific ethnic communities, 
and this further fuelled intercommunal conflict (Verweijen, 2016:67). Thus, the circumstances 
in the post-transitional Kivus - characterised by the proliferation of armed groups and the 
increased militarisation – are indicative of the failure of the Barza in its pursuit of justice and 
sustainable peace.   
6.4 Conclusion  
The diversity of Barza’s actions can be seen to belong to three historical periods: between 1998 
and 2005 in North Kivu; from 2013 to the present in South Kivu; and the more recent revival 
through the Ministry of the interior in North Kivu. Each of these periods involves different 
actors and approaches.  
 
The earlier Barza in North Kivu represented an attempt by community –level ethnic leaders to 
carve out a more independent space in the face of political encroachment by state and rebel 
elites. Thus, the earlier incarnation in North Kivu was exclusively a space for dialogue and 
negotiation. Whereas, the current practices of Barza in the North Kivu is, in effect, a state-run 
institution with a high degree of community participation, and also the present Barza in South 
Kivu contains more routinised approaches to apology, confession and forgiveness, with a closer 
connection to customary and formal courts.  
 
The Barza’s practices have significant implications for the success of transitional justice 
processes in the Kivu provinces in each historical period. Without denying its major 
contributions to conflict de-escalation, the Barza as the local justice mechanism was an 
effective tool for conflict resolution due to its proximity to affected populations and its 
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relevance to local norms and needs. However, local justice itself is not without its 
imperfections, and has been criticised for its approach to confronting widespread human rights 
violations. In addition, operating in ungoverned spaces, which are characterised by the 
presence of multiple regulatory authorities and the prevalence of violence, is extremely 
challenging. In times of ongoing conflict, the Barza was wielded by warring parties as a part 
of non-violent strategies, which rendered the adverse impacts on conflict intensity and conflict 
termination. A series of violent conflicts and peace deals in the post-transitional period are 
tangible evidence that the dynamic processes of the 2003-06 political transition contributed to 
the ongoing armed conflict characterised by the proliferation of armed groups. Hence, the 
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